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Coconspirators, "Coventurers," and the
Exception Swallowing the Hearsay Rule
BEN TRACHTENBERG*
In recent years, prosecutors-sometimes with the blessing of courts-have argued that
when proving the existence of a "conspiracy" to justify admission of evidence under the
Coconspirator Exception to the Hearsay Rule, they need show only that the declarant
and the defendant were "coventurers" with a common purpose, not coconspirators
with an illegal purpose. Indeed, government briefs and court decisions specifically
disclaim the need to show any wrongful goal whatsoever. This Article contends that
such a reading of the Exception is mistaken and undesirable. Conducted for this
Article, a survey of thousands of court decisions, including the earliest English and
American cases concerning the Exception as well as approximately 2500 federal court
opinions discussing the Exception since its federal codification in 1975, makes clear
that a "conspiracy" under the Exception must involve wrongful acts. First, courts and
commentators have for centuries described the Exception as concerning illegal or illicit
conduct. Second, because the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence (and analogous
state codes) intended to adopt the common law understanding of the Exception when
codifying it in Rule 8oi(d) (2) (E), encroachment beyond the historical boundaries of
the Exception violates existing rules of evidence. Third, such revisionism could also
violate the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which has been interpreted
to prohibit admission of "testimonial" hearsay in criminal trials.
To adhere to the historical definition of the Coconspirator Exception to the Hearsay
Rule, prosecutors should stop arguing that the conspiracy joined by the declarant and
defendant may include purely lawful conduct, and courts encountering such arguments
should reject them, lest they find themselves conducting new trials after the rights of
convicted defendants find vindication on appeal. Civil litigants should also resist the
revisionist interpretation of the Exception, which threatens immense and unnecessary
discovery burdens.
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Michael Cahill, Daniel Capra, Edward Cheng, Neil P. Cohen, Lance Jasper, Alexis Loeb, Jens Ohlin,
Paul Shechtman, David Sonenshein, Francine Trachtenberg, Joanna Trachtenberg, and Elizabeth Yale
for their feedback on earlier drafts of this Article. I also thank Brooklyn Law School and Dean Joan
Wexler for providing support for my research. Finally, I note the yeoman service of the Brooklyn Law
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, federal prosecutors have begun asserting a radical
reinterpretation of the Coconspirator Exception to the Hearsay Rule.
The revisionists claim that "conspiracy," for purposes of the Exception,
means any "joint venture" and that the undertaking of the defendant and
declarant need not violate any law. For example, federal prosecutors in
New Jersey wrote in a February 2oo8 filing, "[t]he defendant's main
contention is that the conspiracy or joint venture shown for purposes of
Federal Rule of Evidence 8o1(d)(2)(E) 'must have as its object an
unlawful purpose.' The law, however, is to the contrary."' In other words,
if two persons work together for any purpose-be it planning a burglary,
making money for a common employer, or filing a grant application -the
statement of one "coventurer" may be introduced at the trial of the
other, even a trial concerning completely unrelated acts, so long as the
statement was made in the course of and in furtherance of the joint
activity. Seven federal appellate courts-among other courts-have
indicated their agreement. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit adopted the "joint venture" theory in 2oo6,2 and
federal district courts in Washington have begun following the new rule
as prosecutors have sought its adoption in other jurisdictions. If allowed
to take root and spread, the revisionist interpretation would undermine
the theoretical justifications for the Coconspirator Exception, would
eviscerate limitations governing the principal-agent exception, would add
needless burdens to civil litigation, and would admit as evidence
countless unreliable statements not subject to cross-examination.
The Hearsay Rule is a study in pragmatism.4 Like most rules of
evidence, it exists to further the adversarial search for truth at trial by
admitting reliable evidence and excluding unreliable evidence.5 Because
i. Letter Reply Brief of United States at i, United States v. Schiff, 538 F. Supp. 2d 818 (D.N.J.
Feb. 25, 2oo8) (Crim. No. o6-4o6).
2. See United States v. Gewin, 471 F-3d 197, 200, 201 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (rejecting defendant's
claim "that Rule 8oi(d)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires, before admission of co-
conspirators' out-of-court statements, a showing of an unlawful conspiracy, not merely action in
concert toward a common goal" because circuit "precedents hold that the doctrine is not limited to
unlawful combinations").
3. See infra notes 182-203 and accompanying text.
4. The Federal Rules of Evidence provide, "'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by
the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted," FED. R. EVID. 80I(c), and, "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these
rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of
Congress," id. R. 802.
5. See, e.g., G. MICHAEL FENNER, THE HEARSAY RULE 5 (2003) ("The hearsay rule is about
keeping out evidence that is so unreliable that it does not help us find the truth."); 5 JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §I367, at 32 (Chadbourne rev. ed. 1974) ("For two
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some hearsay evidence is reliable or otherwise desirable, however,
myriad exceptions allow admission of evidence that would otherwise be
excluded under the Rule.' The Coconspirator Exception, a centuries-old
common law rule codified at Rule So(d)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, is simple to state: A statement is admissible against a
defendant, even if hearsay, if when uttering the statement, the declarant
was in an ongoing conspiracy with the defendant and acting in
furtherance of the conspiracy.' The Exception represents a compromise
between judges' desire on one hand to subject testimony to cross-
examination (lest falsehoods reach the jury) and on the other to admit
evidence that seems useful (or where admission seems otherwise
justified) despite falling under the straightforward definition of the Rule.8
Like the exceptions allowing admission of a party's own statements and
those of her agents,9 the Exception embodies the presumption that a
certain class of utterances, despite being out-of-court statements
admitted to prove the truth of the matter asserted, may properly be
treated as evidence regardless of the reliability problems inherent to
hearsay."o Similarly, like every other hearsay exception, the
centuries past, the policy of the Anglo-American system of evidence has been to regard the necessity
of testing by cross-examination as a vital feature of the law. The belief that no safeguard for testing the
value of human statements is comparable to that furnished by cross-examination, and the conviction
that no statement (unless by special exception) should be used as testimony until it has been probed
and sublimated by that test, has found increasing strength in lengthening experience."). The primary
exceptions are legal privileges, such as the attorney-client privilege. The law enforces privileges
despite their tendency to deprive factfinders of reliable evidence, under the theory that other societal
goals (such as promoting open communication between lawyers and clients) outweigh the search for
truth in particular cases. See I EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ArrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-
PRODUcT DOCTRINE 4-1I (5th ed. 2007).
6. See FED. R. EVID. 8oi(d)(2); see also id. R. 803, 804. For justifications for accepting into
evidence the "admissions" defined as "not hearsay" in Rule 8oi(d)(2), see James L. Hetlaud, Jr.,
Admissions in the Uniform Rules: Are They Necessary?, 46 IOWA L. REV. 307. 308-lo (1961).
7. The three requirements are often listed as follows: The proponent of the evidence must prove
(I) the existence of a conspiracy between the defendant and the declarant, (2) that the statement was
made during the pendency of the conspiracy, and (3) that the statement was made in furtherance of
the conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 701 (1974); Anderson v. United States,
417 U.S. 211, 218 (1974) ("[D]eclarations of one conspirator may be used against another conspirator,
if the declaration was made during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. ); City of
Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 558 (11th Cir. 1998).
8. For the remainder of this Article, I will use "the Rule" to refer to the Hearsay Rule and "the
Exception" or "the Coconspirator Exception" to refer to the Coconspirator Exception to the Rule.
9. See FED. R. EVID. 80I(d)(2)(A), (C).
1o. Statements of agents, for example, are justly admissible against principals-even if one doubts
that statements of agents concerning their work are inherently reliable-because principals have a
duty to supervise and take responsibility for their agents. Technically, under the Federal Rules, the
classes of statements listed at Rule 8oi(d) are "not hearsay," as opposed to being a kind of hearsay
that is admissible despite being hearsay, such as the classes of statements (including "present sense
impression" and "excited utterance") collected at Rule 803. To a defendant seeking to exclude
evidence on the basis of the Rule, however, the distinction is immaterial; whether a statement falls
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Coconspirator Exception undercuts, at least somewhat, the ability of a
criminal defendant to confront her accusers. Despite this tension, the
Exception has been a fairly uncontroversial piece of American evidence
law for centuries.
Until now. The "joint venture" theory of the Exception advanced by
prosecutors across the country and accepted by the D.C. Circuit creates
serious problems that proponents have not credibly addressed, to the
extent they have acknowledged the risks at all. To rebut the revisionists'
claim that their interpretation is neither novel nor cause for alarm, this
Article presents the results of a new survey of thousands of federal court
decisions applying the Exception to admit statements that would
otherwise have been barred by the Rule. The survey covers eight federal
circuits, identifying the object of the conspiracy in every case found-
whether in a district court or court of appeals, reported or unreported-
that mentions the admission of evidence under the Exception. As Part III
describes in detail, the survey demonstrates that at least since 1975, it has
been the overwhelming practice of the federal courts to apply the
Exception only to "conspiracies" involving illegal conduct.
This Article explains that the revisionist theory misinterprets
centuries of legal history in pursuit of terrible policy. Courts and
commentators have routinely used words such as "criminal," "illegal,"
"illicit," and "wrongful" when describing the joint conduct relevant to
the Exception," for good reason. The primary credible justification for
the Exception is that without it, clandestine criminal combinations would
evade detection and prosecution. This justification provides no basis for
applying the Exception to lawful joint ventures, and revisionists
accordingly seek refuge in an analogy to agency theory, likening the
Exception to the "principal-agent" hearsay exception applicable to
certain lawful relationships. As Part IV shows, however, the agency
analogy has little basis and was rejected as a fiction by the drafters of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Other asserted justifications fare equally
poorly when applied to lawful joint enterprises.
The revisionist misconstruction of the Exception, already unsound,
also presents constitutional difficulties. Pursuant to the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment, in "all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right. . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him."' 2 Although at first glance the Confrontation Clause would
appear to prohibit the admission of all hearsay, courts have never
enforced such a reading, for the simple reason that those who wrote and
ratified the Bill of Rights knew of hearsay exceptions and had no desire
within a "hearsay exception" or is defined as "not hearsay" has no effect on the ultimate result-the
statement gets to the jury.
II. See, e.g., infra notes 237-40.
12. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIL
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to abolish them.'3 Longstanding exceptions aside, the Confrontation
Clause has prevented the admission of most hearsay at criminal trials in
the United States.' 4 In addition, it has prevented the expansion of
existing exceptions because the rationale for respecting ancient
exceptions -that the authors and ratifiers of the Sixth Amendment knew
of them and approved of them-of course does not apply to exceptions
created or expanded after 1791.5
Notwithstanding the Confrontation Clause, American courts have
always admitted coconspirators' statements at criminal trials.'6 Since
America's independence-indeed, even before then-the Exception has
been applied in the United States and in Britain with little confusion as
to its meaning. There has been, as one might expect, bickering in specific
cases as to whether the prosecutor has established one or more of the
Exception's prongs, with defendants disputing the existence of a
conspiracy between themselves and various declarants, or conceding the
existence of a conspiracy and arguing that the statements at issue either
were not made during the pendency of the conspiracy or were not in
furtherance of its aims. Accordingly, court opinions and learned treatises
provide a rich history of the Exception's application, with case after case
articulating essentially the same definition and testing particular facts
against the well-worn requirements. The "joint venture" theory of the
Exception does not appear in these sources. Because the revisionist
interpretation represents a new hearsay exception, one unknown in 1791,
its increasing acceptance risks the introduction of constitutional error at
trials across the country.
This Article rebuts the revisionist interpretation in multiple ways.
Part I recounts the history of the Hearsay Rule and of the Exception in
England and in the United States, including a discussion of the
codification of the Exception at Federal Rule of Evidence 8o1(d)(2)(E)
13. See infra Part V.A (discussing uncontroversial application of hearsay exceptions in American
courts soon after ratification of the Bill of Rights).
14. See infra Part V. See generally Crawford v. Washington. 541 U.S. 36, 43-56 (2oo4) (reviewing
historical background of the Confrontation Clause).
15. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54 ("[T]he 'right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against
him,' is most naturally read as a reference to the right of confrontation at common law, admitting only
those exceptions established at the time of the founding.") (second alteration in original) (citation
omitted), abrogating Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (providing different method for deciding
which hearsay survived the Confrontation Clause). The first ten Amendments to the Constitution
were proposed by the First Congress on September 25, 1789 and were ratified on December 15, 1791.
16. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-76 (1987) (discussing procedural
requirements for admission of coconspirators' hearsay statements); Am. Fur Co. v. United States, 27
U.S. (2 Pet.) 358, 365 (1829) ("[W]e hold the law to be, that where two or more persons are associated
together for the same illegal purpose. any act or declaration of one of the parties, in reference to the
common object, and forming a part of the res gesta, may be given in evidence against the others. .. )
see also United States v. Johnson, 535 F.3d 892, 897 (8th Cir. 2oo8) (finding no error in admission of
out-of-court statement by drug coconspirator).
[Vol. 61:581586
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and the application of the Exception by federal courts. Part II then
describes current practice and recent developments. It identifies the
court opinions indicating support for the revisionist interpretation and
explains the underlying errors of reasoning, including a common
misconception concerning Supreme Court precedent. Part III presents
the results of the survey discussed above of thousands of federal court
decisions applying the Exception since the codification of the Federal
Rules of Evidence in 1975.' Part IV reconsiders the various rationales
advanced to justify the Exception in light of the revisionist
interpretation, highlighting how weakly the rationales perform if the
Exception is understood to cover joint endeavors with no wrongful
objective. Part V analyzes how the incorrect interpretation could also
violate the Confrontation Clause. It also illustrates how the revisionist
interpretation has already begun afflicting civil litigation. The Conclusion
urges prosecutors to stop making an ahistorical revisionist interpretation
that violates the Rules of Evidence-and potentially the Constitution-
and it asks courts to reject that interpretation if prosecutors (and, soon
enough, more civil litigators) continue to advance it.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE HEARSAY RULE AND THE
COCONSPIRATOR EXCEPTION
This Part traces the history of the Rule and of the Exception,
providing context necessary to a discussion of how the Exception was
understood at the American founding. The Rule arose along with the
Anglo-American adversary criminal trial, which despite its centrality
today to criminal justice in common law countries is a fairly recent
phenomenon; for centuries English courts generally prohibited felony
defendants from employing counsel at trial." Trial counsel, enjoying
newfound freedom to speak for their clients, began objecting to the
admission of various kinds of proof, and the resolution of these
objections became the common law of evidence." Although the Rule
never barred the admission of all hearsay, the several exceptions to it
developed piecemeal, the progeny of countless evidentiary rulings across
17. See Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (announcing rules of evidence that
would become effective 18o days later). One finding of the survey is that although the Exception
applies in principle to both criminal and civil trials, nearly all actual use of the Exception occurs in
criminal cases, with the few civil cases concerning obviously illegal conduct, such as violations of civil
rights laws or the Sherman Antitrust Act. As is discussed infra Part V.D, if the Exception means what
the revisionists claim it does, it would be a powerful tool in civil litigation that one would expect to see
mentioned in judicial opinions.
r8. "Prohibited" is a bit of an oversimplification. For a further explanation of the restrictions on
counsel at treason and felony trials, including details of lawyers' limited opportunities to speak, see
JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE OIGINS OF ADvERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL Io-6 (2003).
19. See generally ANDREw L.-T. CHoo, HEARSAY AND CONFRONTATION IN CRIMINAL TIAS (1996)
(tracing the history of the Rule).
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the kingdom rather than any coherent, coordinated effort to craft an
ideal set of rules. 0 Accordingly, the origins of the Exception resist the
historian's desire to discover a precise birth date or even to identify its
first proponent. Fortunately for American practitioners, however, the
definition and boundaries of the Exception cohered well in advance of
our independence.
A. THE HEARSAY RULE
The criminal jury trial was the product partly of design and partly of
happenstance, and its history helped to steer the development of the
evidentiary principles that would govern its proceedings.2'
i. The Days Before Jury Trials and Witnesses, and the Birth of the
Jury
Before the trial by jury was the trial by battle, in which parties
would fight under the supervision of local authorities according to rules
that originated in Germany and reached England during the Norman
Conquest. The winner of the battle, presumed to have divine favor, was
the winner of the trial." Other ancient techniques included the ordeal,
such as when a defendant was burned with a hot iron and his condition
assessed in three days to determine the Almighty's view of the case, and
the presentation of compurgators.23 Also called "oath-helpers,"
compurgators would swear to the reliability of the accused-not to the
specific content of his testimony but rather to his status as a truthteller.M
A party able to present eleven compurgators was said to have "waged
law" and won a complete acquittal." The history is obscure; it win suffice
to note that in criminal cases, the ancient forms of proof fell into disuse
20. Id. at 3-7.
21. See LANGBEIN, supra note 18 passim.
22. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION To ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 12-13. 72 (4th ed. 2002). Trial by
battle was also known as "wager of battle." See id. at 507.
23. See JOHN HOSTETTLER, THE CRIMINAL JURY OLD AND NEW: JURY POWER FROM EARLY TIMES TO
THE PRESENT DAY 19 (2004). Another ordeal involved drawing a stone from a boiling cauldron, after
which the accused's arm would be examined. Id.
24. Id.
25. See Baker, supra note 22, at 74. For speculation that only certain persons, those deemed less
suspicious by a body that might be considered the precursor of the modern grand jury, could wage law
instead of suffering an ordeal, see Roger D. Groot, The Early- Thirteenth-Century Criminal Jury, in
TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TRUE: THE CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY IN ENGLAND (I200-iSoo), at 3, 5 (J. S.
Cockburn & Thomas A. Green eds., 1988). Wager of law remained an important part of civil practice
until the seventeenth century because it allowed borrowers to avoid repaying debts if they could find
fellows willing to swear to their honesty. Even a cursory discussion of the tactics used by civil plaintiffs
to avoid defeat by oath-helpers would require a recitation of Slade's Case, (1602) 76 Eng. Rep. 1072
(K.B.), and other pronouncements on writs long forgotten in this country. See generally KEVIN M.
TEEVEN. A HISTORY OF THE ANGLo-AMERICAN COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 9-lo, 44 46 (1990)
(discussing wager of law and Slade's Case).
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by the I2oos, with battle strongly discouraged and compurgation and
ordeals banned outright. 6
With compurgators banned by the King and ordeals restricted by
the Pope, English judges began to rely more heavily on the trial by jury,
which in its infancy had little in common with modern jury trials. Early
juries found facts not by sitting passively in a courtroom box but instead
through active investigation.27 In the first place, they lived in a time
during which selection of local jurors made it likely that the factfinders
would have personal knowledge of the defendant, and perhaps also of
the facts giving rise to the charge. 8 Early civil trial practice demonstrated
the same reliance on active jury factfinding, especially because civil
parties were prohibited from testifying, and various legal impediments
discouraged the appearance of knowledgeable third-party witnesses. 29
Unlike parties to civil suits, criminal defendants enjoyed the ability,
perhaps more accurately described as the requirement, to speak in their
own defense. Although technically a prisoner could choose not to speak
at his trial, several factors combined to compel the accused to speak in
nearly all cases.30 The absence of counsel meant that unless the defendant
spoke for himself, no one would cross-examine Crown witnesses. In
addition, many defendants were obviously guilty, and for them the trial
26. Henry II abolished compurgation as a defense to English grand jury charges in the Assize of
Clarendon in ix66. The Church prohibited ordeals, or at least clerical assistance therein, at the Fourth
Lateran Council, convoked by Pope Innocent III and held in 1215. Battle remained on the books until
x8s8, when a murder defendant startled the court by invoking his right to combat. The court held long
disuse had not abolished the legal right to combat, the victim's brother refused to fight, and the
defendant was therefore acquitted. Parliament promptly abolished it for subsequent cases. See THOMAS
Prrr TASWELL-LANGMEAD, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY: FROM THE TEUTONIC CONQUEST TO THE
PRESENT TIME 42 (Philip A. Ashworth, ed. 6th ed. 1960) (discussing Ashford v. Thornton,1 Barn. &
Ald. 405 (1818)).
27. See 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 624-25 (Cambridge, Univ. Press 2d ed. 1899) ("Indeed it is the duty
of the jurors, so soon as they have been summoned, to make inquiries about the facts of which they
will have to speak when they come before the court.").
28. See Roger D. Groot, Petit Larceny, Jury Lenity and Parliament, in "THE DEAREST BIRTH RIGHT
OF THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND": THE JURY IN THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 47, 51-54 (John W.
Cairns & Grant McLeod eds., 2002) (reciting cases of local jurors assigning punishments based on the
reputations of defendants); see also Thomas A. Green, A Retrospective on the Criminal Trial Jury,
12oo-i8oo, in TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TRUE: THE CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY IN ENGLAND (1200-i8oo),
supra note 25, at 358, 362 (describing how prisoners were convinced to consent to trial by local jury).
29. For example, a third-party witness who appeared to testify risked being sued for
"maintenance" by the party against whose interests he spoke. See JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A
PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 126-28 (1898). The development of
compulsory process ameliorated this particular problem, for a witness testifying in response to court
order could not be branded a tortfeasor. Id. at 128-29 (distinguishing among situations, before
compulsory process, in which a witness arrived in court on his own accord-in which case he might be
liable for maintenance-and those in which active jurors found him in his house and questioned him
about the facts-in which case his truthful replies would not constitute maintenance).




served more as a sentencing hearing than as a genuine inquiry into guilt
and innocence.3
When nonparty witnesses did appear-whether testifying for lucky
defendants able to produce friendly witnesses or, more commonly, for
the prosecution-witnesses testifying in the early jury era freely
recounted hearsay." For example, at the celebrated 1571 trial of Thomas
Howard, Fourth Duke of Norfolk, the Queen's counsel read into
evidence various letters (at least one solicited by the prosecution)
recounting the Duke's alleged illegal acts.33 The hearsay evidence
supported prosecution claims that Norfolk had secretly plotted to wed
Mary Stuart, Queen of Scots, despite being forbidden to marry her by
Queen Elizabeth . Elizabeth considered Mary Stuart a rival to her claim
on the English throne, making Norfolk's courtship dangerous at best.?
Even more dire for Norfolk, the hearsay depicted him conspiring with
the Pope to conquer England by force and murder the Queen.35 Having
been released from prison after his initial courtship, Norfolk was
implicated in the "Ridolfi plot," which aimed to assassinate Elizabeth,
replace her with Mary Stuart, and wed Mary to Norfolk, who was among
England's richest men and had Catholic sympathies.36 The discovery of
the Ridolfi plot led to Norfolk's 1571 trial and 1572 execution."
31. For example, a defendant who had been caught red-handed in the act of stealing would likely
not insult the jury by denying his guilt. Instead, he might explain himself in the hope that the jury
would find him guilty of petty larceny instead of grand larceny, which as a felony was punishable by
hanging. See Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury's Constitutional Role in an
Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 79 (2003). In the United States, courts have
noticed that juries would often find sympathetic murder defendants guilty of manslaughter (despite
good evidence supporting a murder conviction) to spare them capital punishment. See Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 302 (1976) ("[T]here is general agreement that American juries have
persistently refused to convict a significant portion of persons charged with first-degree murder of that
offense under mandatory death penalty statutes."); Barkow, supra, at 69 n.165.
32. Indeed, even when early-jury era practices such as independent jury factfinding had
disappeared, witnesses continued to utter hearsay without objection until the mid-16oos. See John H.
Wigmore, The History of the Hearsay Rule, 17 HARV. L. REV. 437, 444 (1904).
33. See Trial of Thomas Howard, i How. St. Tr. 958 (1571); 1 DAVID JARDINE, CRIMINAL TRIALS
157-58 (Gaunt, Inc. reprint 1999) (1832) (describing letter written to the Earl of Murray, a witness,
inquiring what "he knew concerning the doings of the Duke of Norfolk," and then reporting that "the
Earl of Murray's answer to the same letter was produced and read"). Such evidence is a near perfect
example of the kind of hearsay later rejected by the Rule and by the Confrontation Clause. It is
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and it does so through the out-of-court statement of a
witness whom the defendant cannot cross-examine.
34. I JARDINE, supra note 33, at 144.
35. Id. at 184-85 (describing contents of letters, written in cipher, that the Queen's attorney
described as having come to light after having "been discovered by God himself"). The trial record
also contains a more mundane explanation, according to which a servant of Norfolk provided the
letters to a member of the Queen's Privy Council. Id.
36. Id. at £44.
37. See generally NEVILLE WILLIAMs, THOMAS HOWARD, FOURTH DUKE OF NORFOLK (1964).
Viewers of the 3998 movie Elizabeth may recognize certain details of the scheme, which was the basis
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Elizabeth, initially hesitant to order the death of a fellow monarch, had
Mary Stuart executed in 1587 after additional conspiracies against
Elizabeth came to light?8
2. The Development of the Rule
Hearsay's free rein continued well into the i6oos, with an
enforceable Hearsay Rule akin to its modern incarnation not developing
until around 1675 or 169o.39 A few examples will illustrate the important
changes seen in the seventeenth century. During the Long Parliament,
Dr. William Laud, the Archbishop of Canterbury, was tried for treason
in 1644.'4 As in Norfolk's case, Laud's treason trial concerned charges of
secret "Popery,"4' in addition to accusations of "Subversion of the Laws
of the realm," among other offenses.42 Laud, whom history remembers as
an able advocate despite his advanced age and the myriad
inconveniences facing criminal defendants, repeatedly railed against the
prosecution's reliance upon hearsay.43 For all his eloquence and
objections, the hearsay was admitted all the same. Indeed, Laud's
complaints were not objections to the admission of hearsay per se; he did
not argue that the prosecution was barred by law from proffering hearsay
against him. His complaints, rather, were an effort to lessen the power of
the evidence already admitted against him."
Day after day, Laud appeared in the House of Lords and listened to
evidence allegedly spoken, or written, by witnesses whom he could not
confront. A London upholsterer named Grafton testified that he was
wrongfully imprisoned by order of Laud, and Laud reported that to
support this claim, Grafton stated that "Mr. Ingram, Keeper of the Fleet,
of the film's plot, albeit changed so much that Ridolfi, the chief conspirator, does not appear in the
movie. See ELIZABETH (Universal Studios 1998).
38. See ANTONIA FRASER, MARY QUEEN OF ScoTs 429-30, 523-39 (1993).
39. See Wigmore, supra note 32, at 445.
40. See Trial of Dr. William Laud, 4 How. St. Tr. 315 (1695). The account of Laud's trial in
Howell's State Trials purports to be "Written by Himself during his Imprisonment in the Tower" and
refers to Laud in the first person; the editor noted that he supplemented the original manuscript after
consulting additional sources. Id. at 315 & n.*. For a more scholarly report of the trial, see WILLIAM
HOLDEN HUrrON, WILLIAM LAUD 203-18 (London, Methuen & Co. 1895). As Hutton puts it, "The
Archbishop himself, with painful persistence, each day recorded, after all the strain of the examination
and the speaking, the pitiful progress of the trial which would, as he firmly believed, acquit him with
honour in the eyes of foreign nations and of posterity." Id. at 204.
41. HUTTON, supra note 40, at 2o8-o9. Laud defended his honor as an Anglican with great vigor,
enumerating many Englishmen whom he had "brought back" from Catholicism's "fold." Id. at 210.
42. Trial of Dr. William Laud, 4 How. St. Tr. at 316.
43. See, e.g., id. at 383 ("[W]hy doth he [a witness] rest upon a hearsay of sir Thomas Ailsbury's
man? Why was not this man examined to make out the Proof?"); id. at 391 (arguing that certain
statements were "all hearsay, and make[] no evidence, unless [the witnesses] were present to witness
what was said"); id. at 432 ("why are not some of them examined, but this man's report from them
admitted?").
44. The prosecution presented evidence in the morning of each trial day, and Laud rebutted each
morning's evidence in the afternoon session. HurroN, supra note 40, at 208.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
would not give way to [Grafton's] release . . . till he heard from me." 45
Laud objected, "Here is no man produced that heard Mr. Ingram say so;
nor is Mr. Ingram himself brought to testify."46 All the objections, made
by one of the most prominent men in England at a trial of great public
importance, underscore that well into the 16oos, hearsay was fully
admissible at trial.47 In Laud's own case, his attack on the reliability of
the hearsay admitted against him proved useful in convincing the
factfinder to accept his view of the case: the Lords sitting in judgment
refused to find Laud guilty." Undeterred, the House of Commons passed
a bill of attainder finding Laud guilty of treason,49 and the Lords
eventually passed the attainder under great public pressure, allowing
Laud to be executed.50
3. The Treason Trials and Other Major Events
Laud's case provides one example of many in which hearsay
contributed to the ignominious execution of a prominent English subject.
The interregnum 5' and the fractious years before it provided many such
cases. After the restoration of the monarchy, continued political and
religious instability provided fertile ground for judicial barbarity.
Eventually, enough well-placed persons had suffered great injustices that
other prominent figures-such as Parliamentarians with sufficient power
to enact procedural and evidentiary reforms-decided to change the law.
While a full accounting of the wrongful executions of 16oos England
would exceed the scope of even an article far longer than this one, a few
examples should demonstrate why powerful subjects became uneasy. In
the late 1670s, anti-Catholic hysteria manifested in the "Popish Plot," a
fictitious conspiracy wherein prominent Catholics were accused of
planning to kill Charles II and replace him with his Catholic brother,
45. Trial of Dr William Laud, 4 How. St. Tr. at 402.
46. Id. Even if a witness had testified to hearing Ingram "say so," that testimony would have been
hearsay-admitted to prove the matter allegedly asserted by Ingram, that is, that Laud ordered
Granton's detention-meaning that unless Grafton himself heard Laud instruct Ingram to detain
Grafton, Grafton's testimony was actually double hearsay. Cf FED. R. EVID. 8o5.
47. Lord Coke discussed in his Institutes whether a hearsay witness could count toward the
minimum number of witnesses required to prosecute treason. The admissibility of the hearsay was
assumed without discussion. See EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND; CONCERNING HIGH TREASON AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN AND CRIMINAL CAUSES 25
(London, W. Clark & Sons 1817) (1669).
48. Hlu r-oN,supra note 40, at 216.
49. The bill charged him with attempting to "alter the true Protestant religion into Popery" and
"subvert the laws of the kingdom." Id. at 217.
50. One observer of the Lords' deliberation said, "They should do well to agree to the
ordinance ... or else the multitude would force them to it." Id. at 218. Such bills are prohibited by the
Constitution. See U.S. CONsT. art. L. § 9, cl- 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed.").
5i. The interregnum lasted from the '649 execution of King Charles I until i66o, when Charles II
was restored to the throne.
[Vol. 61:581592
THE EXCEPTION SWALLOWING THE HEARSAY RULE 593
James Stuart." Titus Oates, one of the leading accusers, was eventually
convicted of perjury;53 however, by then innocent men had already been
executed.54 Among those killed were Oliver Plunkett, the chief Catholic
prelate of Ireland, and Edward Coleman, James's secretary."
Upon the death of Charles II, the accession of James Stuart to the
throne was at hand, and Charles's illegitimate son raised a woefully
inadequate Protestant rebellion in hopes of preventing James Stuart
from becoming James I.j56 The resulting trials, overseen by Chief Justice
Jeffreys, epitomize the imposition of injustice under color of law and
became known as the "Bloody Assizes."" More than 2oo prisoners were
executed, including a deaf widow in her seventies. 8 Jeffreys is said to
have sold pardons, intervened in trials to rebut evidence presented by the
accused, and to have decided sentences based on utter caprice."
An earlier trial, in which hearsay played a prominent role, has
particular resonance in the United States, perhaps because of the
accused's role in the settlement of colonial America. The 1603 treason
trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, the author, explorer, colonist, soldier,
occasional royal favorite, and eventual political liability, has continuing
relevance in the development of American law, in particular with respect
to hearsay and the Confrontation Clause." Raleigh, like Laud, defended
himself with aplomb that has secured his reputation despite failing to
prevent his execution. Evidence presented against Raleigh included a
52. Trial of Titus Oates, io How. St. Tr. 1079, 1138 (685).
53. Id. at io79.
54. See JOHN POLLOCK, THE POPISH PLOT: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF CHARLES II, at
3 (1903) ("Very serious were his lies to the fifteen men whom he brought to death.").
55. See PAUL BURNS, BUTLER's LIVES OF THE SAINTS 282-83 (2003).
56. See LANGBEIN, supra note 18, at 76-77.
57. Id. Lord George Jeffreys moved on up to prominence during the reign of James II. See
generally DAVID G. CHANDLER, SEDGEMOOR 1685: FRoM MONMOUTH'S INVASION TO THE BLOODY AssizES
(1995) (describing history). His name remains infamous. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36, 67 (2004) (referring to fear of the likes of "the dread Lord Jeffreys" as motivating the creation of
certain constitutional protections).
58. See LANGBEIN, supra note 18, at 76-77.
59. Id. (describing Jeffreys sentencing some to death and others to transportation into indentured
servitude based upon their first names, and telling condemned convicts that "their Godfathers hanged
them").
6o. See Robert P. Mosteller, Confrontation as Constitutional Criminal Procedure: Crawford's
Birth Did Not Require That Roberts Had to Die, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 685, 712-13 (2007) ("Scalia's very
narrow, clear, and definitive account of [Raleigh's trial in Crawford v. Washington] amounts to a
selective recitation that arguably produces an erroneously narrow confrontation doctrine."). Even
before the reexamination of "testimonial" hearsay in Crawford, some had expressed skepticism
concerning the popular belief that Raleigh's trial provides useful guidance in interpreting the
Confrontation Clause. See, e.g., Roger Park, A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay, 86 MICH. L. REV.
51, 90 (1987)-
6i. In Raleigh's case, however, the robust defense likely contributed to a significant delay in
imposing sentence: Raleigh was convicted in 1603 but not executed until i6i8. See generally WILLARD
M. WALLACE, SIR WALTER RALEIGH 217 (1959).
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letter written to the Privy Council by Lord Cobham, whom Raleigh was
given no opportunity to cross-examine." In addition to Cobham's
statements, which have received particular attention from the Supreme
Court centuries later,6 Raleigh also faced testimony from a ship's pilot
named Dyer, who claimed that an unnamed Portuguese gentleman had
said to Dyer that Raleigh would cut the throat of the English king.64
Despite Raleigh's complaints about the unreliability of the prosecution's
hearsay, the evidence came in, and Raleigh was convicted, a result that
eventually became known as a great injustice.6
In response to infamous treason trials, reformers following the
Glorious Revolution began describing how defective trial procedures had
contributed to the unjust results.6  Although the proposed reforms
concerned matters other than hearsay, their eventual enactment
supported the development of an effective Hearsay Rule. For example,
the Treason Trials Act of 16966' allowed treason defendants to "hold
over" defense witnesses with compulsory process, which until then was
61available only to the prosecution. More important with respect to
hearsay were provisions allowing defendants to retain attorneys to
represent them at trial (as well as at pretrial hearings) and solicitors to
62. See Mosteller, supra note 6o, at 713-14.
63. E.g., Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44, 52 ("Leaving the regulation of out-of-court statements to the
law of evidence would render the Confrontation Clause powerless to prevent even the most flagrant
inquisitorial practices. Raleigh was, after all, perfectly free to confront those who read Cobham's
confession in court.").
64. Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, 2 How. St. Tr. i, 25 (1603); see also Myrna Raeder, Remember the
Ladies and the Children Too: Crawford's Impact on Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71
BROOK. L. REV. 311, 318-19 (2005) (noting the significant nontestimonial hearsay implicating Raleigh).
65, I JARDINE, supra note 33, at 520 (quoting trial judge reflecting that "the justice of England has
never been so degraded and injured as by the condemnation of Sir Walter Raleigh"); see also AKHIL
REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 109-17 (1998) (discussing resonance
in newly-independent America of Raleigh trial and later injustices, which together motivated certain
constitutional provisions).
66. See LANGBEIN, supra note 18, at 78-79. The Glorious Revolution of 1688 to 1689 replaced
King James II with the joint monarchy of Mary II and William III. Mary was the Protestant daughter
of the deposed James; William was her Dutch Protestant husband and the Prince of Orange. The
Revolution ensured that British monarchs would thereafter all be Protestants. See generally
REDEFINING WILLIAM Ill: THE IMPACT OF THE KING-STADHOLDER IN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT (Esther
Mijers & David Onnekink eds., 2007).
67. Treason Act of 1695, 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 3 (Eng.), reprinted in 7 STATUTES OF THE REALM 6-7
(1820).
68. Id. § 7 ("[A]ll Persons soe accused and indicted for any such Treason as aforesaid shall have
the like Processe of the Court where they shall bee tryed to compell their Witnesses to appeare for
them att any such Tryal or Tryals as is usually granted to compell Witnesses to appeare against
them."). The inability to secure witnesses had posed unsurprising practical problems for defendants.
The record of the trial of William Ireland reports that the defendant "observed [upon calling his first
witness], 'It is an hundred to one if he be here; for I have not been perrmitted so much as to send a
scrap of paper.'" JAMES FITZJAMEs STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 388
(London, MacMillan & Co. 1883) (quoting Trial of William Ireland, 7 How. St. Tr. 79, I21 (1678)).
The account then notes, "All the prisoners were convicted and executed." Id.
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assist their attorneys by performing investigationst Competent counsel
could object to improper evidence-as hearsay came to be known-far
more effectively than could malnourished, desperate defendants. The
development of the Rule was surely hastened by the environment of
reform, in which the procedural rights of defendants received serious
consideration and commentators openly discussed the hazards of undue
royal influence on judicial proceedings. Whereas before the Revolution
there had been little public outcry on behalf of the wrongly accused, the
political climate at the end of the seventeenth century allowed the
development of rules-some, like those of the Treason Trials Act,
enacted by Parliament and others, like the newly robust Hearsay Rule,
crafted by judges-that won elite approval despite their tendency to
increase the difficulty of criminal prosecution.
4. Crystallization of the Rule
A few decades after Archbishop Laud railed against out-of-court
statements with no hope of winning their exclusion, the law of hearsay
had changed dramatically, developing into a rule of evidence that
excluded certain testimony much as the Rule does today. At the 1683
treason trial of William Russell, the former leader of the Whigs in the
House of Commons, the presiding judge announced that "the giving of
evidence by hear-say, will not be evidence; what colonel Rumsey or Mr.
Ferguson told Mr. West, is no evidence." 70 By 1690, the Rule was solid, as
the rulings of Justice Dolben at the murder trial of John Cole illustrate:7'
Mrs. Milward. My lord, my husband declared to me, that he and Mr.
Cole were in the coach with Dr. Clenche, and that they two killed Dr.
Clenche.
Just. Dolben. That is no evidence at all, what your husband told you;
that won't be good evidence, if you don't know somewhat of your own
knowledge.
Mrs. Milward. My lord, I have a great deal more that my husband
told me to declare.
Just. Dolben. That won't do; what if your husband had told you that
I killed Dr. Clenche, what then? That will stand for no evidence in law:
we ought by the law to have no man called in question, but upon very
69. See Treason Act § i; see also LANGBEIN, supra note 18, at 92-96 (describing distinction
between attorneys and solicitors).
70. Trial of William Lord Russell, 9 How. St. Tr. 577, 613 (1683) (documenting argument by
attorney general that hearsay exception might apply). For more on Lord Russell and his role in the
"Rye House Plot" against King Charles II, see Lois 0. Schwoerer, William, Lord Russell: The Making
of a Martyr, 1683-1983, 24 J. Barr. STUD. 41, 49-50 (1985). The exception stressed in Russell's case,
that hearsay should be admissible if proffered to support other testimony, appeared also at a 1683
inquest into the alleged suicide of Arthur, Earl of Essex. See Trial of Laurence Braddon & Hugh
Speke, 9 How. St. Tr. 1127, 1272 (1683) ("It is true, no man ought to suffer barely upon hearsay
evidence, but such testimony hath been used to corroborate what else may be sworn . .)
71. Trial of John Cole, 12 How. St. Tr. 875 (1692).
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good grounds, and good evidence, upon oath, and that upon the verdict
of twelve good men.72
The jury acquitted Cole. Subsequent cases in the early 17oos repeat
the Rule and show little dispute about its general meaning,74 and
contemporary treatises agree.75 Wigmore concluded that by the mid-
1700s, "the rule is no longer to be struggled against; and henceforth the
only question can be how far there are to be specific exceptions to it.""
B. THE COCONSPIRATOR EXCEPTION
From the Rule's earliest days, judges applying it allowed for
exceptions. The use of "dying declarations," for example, wherein a
person's last words may be admitted to prove the matter asserted so long
as they concern the decedent's cause of death,77 predated the Hearsay
Rule by centuries and seems never to have been threatened by the
development of the Rule.'8 Similarly, the Rule's judicial crafters did not
attempt to prevent the admission of regular entries in public rolls,
ancient documents, and hearsay concerning family pedigree."
i. Development of the Exception in England
The Coconspirator Exception, while perhaps not as old as the rules
providing for admission of dying declarations and hearsay concerning
parish boundaries," easily predates American independence. The 1683
72. Id. at 876. Mrs. Milward's husband had died before the trial. Id.
73. Id. at 884.
74. See, e.g., Trial of Thomas Earl of Macclesfield, 16 How. St. Tr. 767, 1137 (1725) (rejecting
evidence despite complaint by proponent that declarant's death suspends the Rule-"by his death you
have lost your evidence"); Trial of George Earl of Wintoun, 15 How. St. Tr. 8o6. 856 (1716) ("For the
sake of evidence, it is incumbent on us to desire that my lord confines himself to ask the [witness] what
he knows, and not to what he heard said."); Trial of Wm. Kidd, 14 How. St. Tr. 147, 177 (1701) ("[W]e
cannot read certificates; they must speak viva voce.").
75. See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 596-97 (London 1716) ("As to ... how
far hearsay should be admitted.... It seems ... agreed, that what a ... stranger has been heard to say
is in strictness no manner of evidence either for or against a prisoner, not only because it is not upon
oath, but also because the other side hath no opportunity of a cross-examination . . . .").
76. Wigmore, supra note 32, at 448 (footnote omitted). As a practical matter, the strengthening of
the Rule was aided immeasurably by the Treason Act and other reforms discussed above.
77. See FED. R. EVID. 8o4(b)(2) ("Hearsay exceptions.-The following are not excluded by the
hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: .. .(2) Statement under belief of impending
death.-In a prosecution for homicide or in a civil action or proceeding, a statement made by a
declarant while believing that the declarant's death was imminent, concerning the cause or
circumstances of what the declarant believed to be impending death.").
78. See THAYER, supra note 29, at 519-20 (providing examples of such declarations coming into
evidence as early as 1202 and noting that they remained admissible in the 1700s).
79. See id. at 520; see also FED. R. EvID. 803(8) (public records and reports); id. R. 803(16)
(statements in ancient documents); id. R. 803(13) (family records).
8o. See I SIMoN GREENLEAF. A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §139, at 225 27 (Boston,
Little, Brown, & Co. 16th ed. 1899) (noting use of maps and other old documents as "reputation"
evidence concerning boundaries of parishes and other places); RANSOM H. TYLER, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF BOUNDARIES AND FENCES 3 17-17 (Albany, William Gould & Son 1876) (collecting cases).
[Vol. 61:581596
February 2010] THE EXCEPTION SWALLOWING THE HEARSAY RULE 597
treason trial of Lord Russell, discussed above,8' involved the admission of
coconspirator statements that clearly were hearsay. That Russell may
have suffered unjust prosecution is not without irony; he had proposed
that James Stuart-then the Duke of York and not yet King James II-
be tried and executed for participation in the Popish Plot, which, as it
turned out, was a fictitious conspiracy.2 Accused of conspiring to kill
King Charles II and his brother, Russell was confronted with testimony
by a government witness, himself a confessed plotter who spoke against
Russell to save his own life, concerning the statements of a third person
also alleged to have participated in the treason.8 ' The third person, who
was not available for cross-examination, purportedly said, "There is
above ten thousand brisk boys are ready to follow me" in a rising against
the King.4 Recall that at this same trial, the court sustained a general
objection by Russell to the admission of hearsay;" the statements of
coconspirators received different treatment.
As Professor Mueller has explained, the Exception arose somewhat
accidentally, resulting from the conflict of two principles of English law.
On the one hand, the substantive law of criminal conspiracy provided (as
it does now) that the actus reus of the crime consisted of the agreement to
commit illegal conduct. Admittedly, in certain jurisdictions some overt
act eventually became necessary to obtain a convictionm yet every
criminal law student can recite the rule that a single overt act by one
conspirator will suffice to convict multiple malefactors."9 The out-of-court
statements of criminal conspirators accordingly became criminal acts of
obvious relevance to proving criminal allegations. On the other hand,
black-letter evidence law teaches that unsworn out-of-court statements
are hearsay and must as a result be excluded. The tension can be
resolved, at least in part, by recalling that certain utterances are both
81. See supra note 7o and accompanying text.
82. See Schwoerer, supra note 70, at 47-48 (discussing anti-James statements by Russell); supra
notes 52-55 and accompanying text (describing the "Popish Plot").
83. Schwoerer, supra note 70, at 49 & n.38 ("William Howard, third Baron Howard of Escrick,
who had turned state's evidence, made the charge at William Russell's trial.").
84. See Trial of William Lord Russell, 9 How. St. Tr. 577, 604 (1683); see also Christopher B.
Mueller, The Federal Coconspirator Exception: Action, Assertion, and Hearsay, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV.
323, 325-26 (1984) (discussing early cases).
85. Trial of William Lord Russell, 9 How. St. Tr. at 613.
86. Id. at 6o8, 635.
87. See Mueller, supra note 84, at 326.
88. Compare Hogan v. O'Neill, 255 U.S. 52, 55 (1921) ("[At] common law, a conspiracy to
commit a crime is itself a criminal offense, although no overt act be done in pursuance of it. ), with
CAL. PENAL CODE §I14 (West 1999) ("No agreement amounts to a conspiracy, unless some act, beside
such agreement, be done within this state to effect the object thereof, by one or more of the parties to
such agreement . .)
89. See Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 53 (1942) ("The overt act, without proof of
which a charge of conspiracy cannot be submitted to the jury, may be that of only a single one of the
conspirators and need not be itself a crime.").
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statements (in that they convey information from the declarant to the
listener) and acts. A chairman who says, "I call this meeting to order,"
has said something and has also done something-called the meeting to
order. An attorney who exclaims, "I object," has not only communicated
her displeasure to everyone in the courtroom but has also performed an
act with legal significance.' Similarly, if the average person were to gaze
upon the seashore, spot a passing vessel, and declare, "I name this ship
the U.S.S. George Washington," the statement would likely be somewhat
confusing, and almost surely ineffectual. If the right person, however,
says the same thing at the right time and place, the ship might actually
receive a new name.9'
Coconspirator statements, or at least some of them, exhibit the same
statement-act duality. Imagine one acquaintance, A, saying to another, B,
"I mean to kill the King. Will you help me?" If B replies, "You can rely
on me," those words are both a statement and an act. Indeed, the words
compose an act of sufficient gravity to justify B's execution at common
law. Let us further imagine the trial of A for treason, at which C, who
clandestinely overhead the conversation, is called to recount what A and
B said. Counsel for A cannot object to the admission of A's initial
question of B; it comes in as a party admission. But what of B's reply? If
B is not on trial, her reply is not a party admission. Regardless, a
prosecutor seeking to admit B's statement might argue that he need not
cite any hearsay exception whatsoever because B's statement is not
hearsay; the prosecution does not offer it "in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted."93 The prosecution's argument has some sense to
it. After all, it does not matter to A's substantive guilt whether A actually
could "rely on" B; at issue is whether A and B entered an illegal
conspiracy. The prosecutor proposes to admit B's statement not to prove
that it is true-that A could rely on B-but instead to prove that A and B
agreed to kill the king. More than a mere statement to A, the law deems
the words of B a criminal act, and it is the act that the prosecutor means
to show to the jury.94 In a jurisdiction following the modern trend toward
90. Even if the presiding judge ignores the verbal act, the attorney has preserved her objection.
91. See generally J.L. AUSTIN, How To Do THINGS WITH WORDS (J.O. Urmson & Marina Sbisai
eds., 2d ed. 1975) (exploring statement-act duality). Consider also the words "I do."
92. See FED. R. EVID. 8oi(d)(2)(a).
93. Id. R. 8o i(c).
94. One can easily imagine words being deemed acts for evidentiary purposes outside the
criminal law. For example, a civil suit for wrongful death might concern "survivorship" claims, which
are claims based on injuries suffered by the decedent before death. Eg.. Moore-McCormack Lines,
Inc. v. McMahon, 235 F.2d 142, 145 n.2 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting). If the parties disputed the
time of death, and accordingly how long the victim suffered before death, a third-party witness could
testify that he heard the victim shout "I'm alive" without fearing a hearsay objection. For that matter,
testimony that the victim inaccurately shouted "I'm dead" would be just as useful. See Christopher B.
Mueller, Post-Modern Hearsay Reform: The Importance of Complexity, 76 MINN. L. REV. 367, 415
(1992) (providing "I'm alive" example).
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the criminalization of unilateral conspiracies, the "truth" of B's reliability
would be especially irrelevant at A's trial.95
Professor Mueller recounts that most coconspirator statements
admitted at prominent English trials did not actually have hearsay
significance because the statements at issue were themselves criminal
acts, such as letters from one conspirator to another listing locations for
potential invasions of England. 6 Nonetheless, the confusion among acts
and statements, in addition to the confounding existence of other hearsay
exceptions that might justify admissions of coconspirator statements not
qualifying as acts,97 soon led prominent judges and commentators to
deduce a hearsay exception from the various cases in which
coconspirator statements came into evidence-a principle of evidence
law essentially identical to the modern Exception.
2. Adoption of the Exception in the United States
The Exception is noted in early American evidence treatises and
appears in cases older than the Republic. Considering the origin of the
Exception, it is no surprise that the earliest American references to it
explicitly refer to the illegality of the conduct performed by the
coconspirators. Thomas Starkie, whose English treatise on evidence was
republished in multiple American editions and received great respect
from American jurists, described the Exception as follows:
Where several combine together for the same illegal purpose, each is
the agent of all the rest, and any act done by one in furtherance of the
unlawful design is, in consideration of law, the act of all. . . . And as a
declaration accompanying an act strongly indicates the nature and
intention of the act, or, more properly, perhaps, is to be considered as
part of the act, a declaration made by one conspirator at the time of
doing an act in furtherance of the general design, is evidence against
the other conspirators.
95. See, e.g., State v. Rambousek, 479 N.W.2d 832, 833-34 (N.D. 1992) ("Under the unilateral
approach, as distinguished from the bilateral approach, the trier-of-fact assesses the subjective
individual behavior of a defendant, rendering irrelevant in determining criminal liability the
conviction, acquittal, irresponsibility, or immunity of other co-conspirators. Under the traditional
bilateral approach, there must be at least two 'guilty' persons, two persons who have agreed." (quoting
State v. Kihnel, 488 So. 2d 1238, 1240 (La. Ct. App. 1986))); see also Peter Buscemi, Note, Conspiracy:
Statutory Reform Since the Model Penal Code, 75 COLUM. L. REV. I122, 1135-36 (1975).
96. See Mueller, supra note 84, at 328 & n.15.
97. For one such confounding example, see supra note 92 and accompanying text.
98. 2 THOMAS STARKIE, A PRAcTIcAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 402 (Phila., P.H. Nicklin
& T. Johnson 3d American ed. i830) (emphasis added). For examples of American courts relying on
Starkie in the first decade of the nineteenth century, see, for example, Murdock vt. Hunter, £7 F. Gas.
1013, 10o6 n.4 (C.C.D. Va. r8o8) (No. 9941), which relied on Starkie for "the general rule" deduced
from review of cases. The opinion in Murdock was written by Chief Justice John Marshall, sitting as
Circuit Justice. See id. at 1ol4; see also, e.g., Chase v. Lincoln, 3 Mass. (3 Tyng) 236, 237 fl.3 (1807).
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S.M. Phillipps, another scholar well respected when the United
States was young," used a similar formulation to discuss when statements
of conspirators could be admitted against their confederates despite the
Hearsay Rule:
It is an established rule, that where several persons are proved to have
combined together for the same illegal purpose, any act done by one of
the party in pursuance of the original concerted plan, and with
reference to the common object, is, in the contemplation of the law, the
act of the whole party.... It follows, that any writings or verbal
expressions, being acts in themselves, or accompanying and explaining
other acts, and therefore part of the res gestae, and which are brought
home to one conspirator, are evidence against the other conspirators,
provided it sufficiently appear that they were used in furtherance of a
common design.oo
Phillipps went on to distinguish cases involving letters from one
conspirator to another written to encourage the common plot, which
would be admissible, from a "mere relation of some part of the
transaction," which would depend "on the credit of the narrator, who is
not before the court, and therefore it cannot be received."o'0 It would
appear that by the early-nineteenth century, American recitations of the
Exception strongly resembled the modern incarnation codified in the
Federal Rules of Evidence. As Starkie and Phillipps summarize, the law
allowed for admission of the statements of one conspirator against
another, but only so long as the out-of-court statement was made during
the conspiracy's pendency and in furtherance of it. That said, the
Coconspirator Exception did not appear only in learned treatises, and a
review of early cases reveals some differences from modem practice, as
well as some uncertainty among early American practitioners concerning
the preciso scope of the Exception.
The Exception existed in American substantive law at least as early
as 1791, and was discussed by the Supreme Court in 1827 and 1829."02 A
decision by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts shows that the
Exception was not controversial in 1830. In Commonwealth v.
Crowninshield, the prosecution alleged a conspiracy to commit murder.0 3
Objecting to the admission of certain coconspirator statements, counsel
99. See, e.g., Turner v. Austin, 16 Mass. (16 Tyng) 181, 185 (1819) (rejecting plaintiffs objection
to the admission of certain testimony after defendant's counsel %'referred to the American edition of
Phillips's Law of Evidence"); Rumsey v. Lovell, Ant. N.P. Cas. 17, 29-30 n.2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. i8o8).
100. S. MARCH PHILLIPPs, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 199-200 (N.Y., Banks, Gould &
Co. 3 d ed. 1849) (emphasis added).
101. Id. at 201.
102. See Am. Fur Co. v. United States, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 358, 363-65 (1829); United States v.
Gooding, 25 U.S. ( 2 Wheat.) 460, 468-70 (1827); Patton v. Freeman, I N.J.L. 134, 136 (1791); Michael
L. Seigel & Daniel 'Weisman, The Admissibility of Co-Conspirator Statements in a Post-Crawford
World, 34 FLA. Si. U. L. REV. 877, 883 (2007).
103. 27 Mass. (xo Pick.) 497, 497 (x83o).
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for the defendant did not challenge the principle that such statements
were generally admissible, arguing instead that the prosecution had
failed to connect the defendant on trial to the particular declarant at
issue.0 4 Following argument by the prosecution that included a reference
to Starkie's treatise on evidence, the court, itself citing Phillipps, held
that the evidence was admissible.' The Crowninshield court relied in
part on a Supreme Court decision of the previous year,' 6 American Fur
Co. v. United States, which stated that "where two or more persons are
associated together for the same illegal purpose, any act or declaration of
one of the parties, in reference to the common object, and forming a part
of the res gesta, may be given in evidence against the others."'"
Importantly, the American Fur decision clarified the Court's earlier
opinion in United States v. Gooding."'
In Gooding, the owner of a ship was charged with violating the
Slave Trade Act0 9 by arranging for Hill, the ship's captain, to bring
African slaves to Cuba."o As evidence, the prosecution offered the
testimony of Coit, another sailor, who said that Hill attempted to recruit
Coit to serve as his mate on the slaving voyage."' Justice Story described
Coit as having testified
that he, Captain Coit, was at St. Thomas while the General Winder
[Gooding's ship] was at that island in September, 1824, and was
frequently on board the vessel at that time, that Captain Hill, the
master of the vessel, then and there proposed to the witness to engage
on board the General Winder as mate for the voyage then in progress,
and described the same to be a voyage to the coast of Africa, for slaves,
and thence back to Trinidad de Cuba; that he offered to the witness
seventy dollars per month, and five dollars per head for every prime
slave which should be brought to Cuba; that on the witness inquiring
who would see the crew paid in the event of a disaster attending the
voyage, Captain Hill replied, "Uncle John," meaning (as the witness
understood) John Gooding, the defendant." 2
Although Gooding has become known as the first Supreme Court
case to employ the Exception,"' the Court's opinion demonstrates that
104. Id. at 498.
105. Id. at 499 & n.i (citing 2 SAMUEL MARCH PHILLIPPS, PHILLIPPs' EVIDENCE 177 et seq. (Cowen &
Hill's Ed.)).
io6. Id. at 499 n.I.
107. Am. Fur Co., 27 U.S. at 365. American Fur concerned a trader convicted of bringing liquor
into Indian country with the intention to sell whiskey to Indians in violation of federal law. Id. at 358-
59.
T'o8. Gooding, 25 U.S. 460; see also Am. Fur. Co., 27 U.S. at 36445.
1o9. Ch. 91, 3 Stat. 450 (i8i8).
iio. Gooding, 25 U.S. at 468.
xII. Id.
112. Id. at 468.
I113. See Measures Relating to Organized Crime, Hearing Before the Sub comm. on Criminal Laws
and Procedures of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. (1969), reprinted in i 15 CONG. REC.
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the evidence was actually admitted pursuant to the principal-agent
exception to the Hearsay Rule,"4 under the theory that Hill was acting in
the scope of his employment when he tried to recruit another sailor for
his boss's ship. Gooding's counsel argued
that the testimony is not admissible, because, in criminal cases, the
declarations of the master of the vessel are not evidence to charge the
owner with an offence; and that the doctrine of the binding effect of
such declarations by known agents, is, and ought to be, confined to civil
cases."9
The Court rejected this theory, holding, "In general the rules of
evidence in criminal and civil cases are the same. Whatever the agent
does, within the scope of his authority, binds his principal, and is
deemed his act.... Nor is there any authority for confining the rule
to civil cases."" 6 Indeed, the Court buttressed its reasoning with a
citation to Starkie, referring not to a section on the Coconspirator
Exception, but instead to Starkie's discussion of statements by
agents."' Because the holding of Gooding concerned principals and
agents, the Supreme Court needed to clarify the law when presented
with true coconspirator statements in American Fur. Responding to
the argument that the declarant in American Fur acted in concert
with the defendant instead of as the defendant's agent, and that
23,433, 23,435, 23,439 (1969) (testimony of Henry S. Ruth, Professor, University of Pennsylvania
School of Law) ("The exception has come to rest in American jurisprudence ... as articulated by Mr.
Justice Storey [sic] in United States v. Gooding.... .); Norman M. Garland & Donald E. Snow, The
Co-Conspirators Exception to the Hearsay Rule: Procedural Implementation and Confrontation Clause
Requirements, 63 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE ScI. 1, 5 & n.43 (1972) (citing Gooding, 25 U.S. 460,
to support claim that the Exception "has long been accepted"); see also John Bilyeu Oakley, From
Hearsay to Eternity: Pendency and the Co-Conspirator Exception in California-Fact, Fiction, and a
Novel Approach, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. I, 14-15 (1975) ("Gooding involved a business venture
which was every bit as commercial as it was illicit, and which was accordingly organized and operated
along conventional business lines. As a result, the conspirators shared a classic civil agency
relationship.").
114. See FED. R. EVID. 8oI(d)(2)(D) (defining as "not hearsay" any "statement by the party's agent
or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the
existence of the relationship"). The existence of the agent exception undercuts arguments that the
Coconspirator Exception is justified because each conspirator is the agent of all his fellows. Were that
the case, the Coconspirator Exception would be unnecessary, but the agent exception is not nearly so
broad. If nothing else, the agent exception is narrower because it runs in only one direction: although
the agent's statements may be admitted against the principal, the principal's may not be used against
the agent. Other limitations are discussed infra notes 276-78 and accompanying text.
115. 25 U.S. at 469.
I6. Id. Gooding likely became associated with the Exception because, after the Court stated that
the principal-agent exception applied in criminal cases, it then went on to mention that
in cases of conspiracy and riot, when once the conspiracy or combination is established, the
act of one conspirator, in the prosecution of the enterprise, is considered the act of all, and
is evidence against all. Each is deemed to consent to, or command, what is done by any
other in furtherance of the common object.
117. Id. at 470 &n.a.
[Vol. 61:581602
THE EXCEPTION SWALLOWING THE HEARSAY RULE 603
accordingly the rule of Gooding could not justify admitting the
declarant's out-of-court statement, the American Fur Court
expressly adopted the Exception:
The principle asserted in the decision of that point [in Gooding], and
applied to the case was, that whatever an agent does, or says, in
reference to the business in which he is at the time employed, and
within the scope of his authority, is done or said by the principal; and
may be proved, as well in a criminal as a civil case; in like manner as if
the evidence applied personally to the principal.
The opinion of the court in the present case is not less correct,
whether Davis was considered by the jury as having acted in
conjunction with Wallace, or strictly as his agent. For we hold the law
to be, that where two or more persons are associated together for the
same illegal purpose, any act or declaration of one of the parties, in
reference to the common object, and forming a part of the res gesta,
may be given in evidence against the others . . . ."
The Exception as stated in American Fur, and applied in
Crowninshield and many other cases," 9 strongly resembles the modern
codified rule, and it clearly refers to criminal combinations.' 20 And so it
went for the rest of the century, with American courts routinely applying
the Exception without much debate about the underlying legal
principles. Instead, the cases show agreement on the basics-that the
proponent must establish a criminal conspiracy, furtherance, and
pendency-along with disagreements about the application to particular
cases. The Supreme Court of Colorado considered in 1905 whether a
woman who allowed her fetus to be aborted could be said to "conspire"
with the abortion provider, a finding that would allow her out-of-court
statements to be introduced at the abortionist's trial."' In 1904 the
Supreme Court of Iowa vacated a murder conviction after the trial court
admitted a coconspirator's hearsay statement that the appellate court
found "was not made in furtherance of the unlawful plan." 2 2 The
118. Am. Fur Co. v. United States, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 358, 364-65 (1829).
119. See CHARLEs HUGHES, HUGHES' CRIMINAL LAW 327 n.65 (1901) (collecting cases).
120. To be sure, there was some uncertainty about the scope of the Exception. See Seigel &
Weisman, supra note 102, at 904-07 (discussing history suggesting that early American practitioners
might have thought the Exception even narrower than American Fur and the current Federal Rules of
Evidence would indicate).
121. Johnson v. People, 8o P. 133, 137-38 (Colo. 1905) ("If the woman is not technically an
accomplice, she may nevertheless conspire with others to produce the abortion; and, the conspiracy
being shown, her acts and declarations in furtherance of the common design are evidence against
others engaged with her in the criminal act." (quoting Solander v. People, 2 Colo. 48, 63 (1873))). The
hearsay statement of Pearl Gordon, who died from the procedure, was repeated at trial by her
husband. Id. at 138.
122. State v. Walker, 0oo N.W. 354, 357 (Iowa 1904) ("What Levich said, as testified to by the
witness, was, in substance, that he had a grudge or grievance against Finkelstein, and that he had hired
defendant to do him an injury. This declaration was not made in furtherance of the unlawful plan; it
had no relevancy to the carrying out of that plan; but it was a mere narrative of a fact, made by Levich
upon his own responsibility, and not purporting in any way to represent the defendant.").
February 20Io]
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Supreme Court of Wisconsin, declaring the rule at issue "too elementary
to require discussion,"'23 vacated a conviction in 1909 after holding that
the trial court improperly admitted a coconspirator statement made after
the conclusion of the criminal plot."' The cases applying the Exception
provide a tour of the penal code, discussing crimes ranging from bribery
to embezzlement to liquor-selling to revenue frauds.'
In the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court repeatedly
expressed reluctance to expand the Exception, for example refusing to
construe the "in furtherance of" requirement to include efforts to
conceal the acts after the primary objectives of the conspiracy had been
reached, and requiring instead that admissible statements concern overt
acts as charged in the indictment.'6 In Dutton v. Evans, the Court held in
a plurality opinion that the states may offer a broader hearsay exception
than federal rules or holdings provide, reasoning that the narrowness of
the federal exception was derived from federal rulemaking power, not
from the Confrontation Clause itself.'27 Dutton concerned a Georgia
homicide conviction based upon testimony about coconspirator
statements from the "concealment phase," and the Court declined to
grant a writ of habeas corpus despite acknowledging that the statements
would not have been admitted at a federal trial."'
3. Codification in the Federal Rules of Evidence and Other Codes
The federal evidence rule at issue in Dutton was judicially created;
the Federal Rules of Evidence did not yet exist in 1970. Although the
idea of codifying the federal evidence rules had been floated in the 1930S
soon after the enactment of the Rules Enabling Act, not much work
occurred before 1961, when Chief Justice Earl Warren appointed a
Special Committee on Evidence. 9 After extensive effort from 1965 to
123. Miller v. State, ii9 N.W. 850, 862 (Wis. 1909) (holding that a statement "was mere
hearsay ... because the admissions of one of two persons concerned in a criminal act, after the fact, is
not evidence against the other").
124. Id. at 864.
125. See JOHN HENRY wIGMORE, A SUPPLEMENT TO A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §I079 (2d ed. 1915) (listing cases decided since publication of previous
edition of Wigmore's treatise).
126. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 44o, 444 (1949) (rejecting admission of statement "not
made in furtherance of the alleged criminal transportation conspiracy charged, but made in
furtherance of an alleged implied but uncharged conspiracy aimed at preventing detection and
punishment"); see also Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 399 (1957): Lutwak v. United States,
344 U.S. 604, 616-18 (953).
127. 400 U.S. 74, 82 (3970) (plurality opinion).
128. Id. at 81, 90. In a dissent joined by three other Justices, Justice Marshall argued that the
admission of coconspirator statements made during the "concealment phase," as opposed to
statements made in furtherance of an ongoing scheme, manifested "a clear violation of Evans'
constitutional rights." Id. at ioo, io6 n.8 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
329. See Paul R. Rice & Neals-Erik William Delker, Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory
Committee: A Short History of Too Little Consequence, 191 F.R.D. 678, 682-83 (2000).
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1974, Congress eventually passed the Rules, which were signed into law
on January 2, 1975.30 A review of statements by drafters, legislative
history, and scholarly commentary reveals two important facts about the
codification of the Exception in Rule 8o(d)(2)(E). First, the codified
rule was meant to have precisely the same substance as the Exception
had at common law when the Rules took effect.' 3' Second, it was widely
understood by contemporary observers -albeit rarely stated explicitly
because so obvious-that the word "conspiracy" in Rule 8o1(d)(2)(E)
refers to illegal activity.'
Concerning proposed Rule 8o(d)(2)(E), the entire comment of the
Advisory Committee was the following:
The limitation upon the admissibility of statements of co-
conspirators to those made "during the course and in furtherance of
the conspiracy" is in the accepted pattern. While the broadened view
of agency taken in item (iv) [i.e., Rule 8o1(d)(2)(D)] might suggest
wider admissibility of statements of co-conspirators, the agency theory
of conspiracy is at best a fiction and ought not to serve as a basis for
admissibility beyond that already established. See Levie, Hearsay and
Conspiracy, 52 Mich.L.Rev. 1159 (1954); Comment, 25 U.Chi.L.Rev.
530 (1958). The rule is consistent with the position of the Supreme
Court in denying admissibility to statements made after the objectives
of the conspiracy have either failed or been achieved. Krulewitch v.
United States, 336 U.S. 440, 69 S. Ct. 716, 93 L. Ed. 790 (1949); Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 490, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441
(1963). For similarly limited provisions see California Evidence Code
§ 1223 and New Jersey Rule 63(9)(b). Cf. Uniform Rule 63(9)(b).'
The Advisory Committee referred directly to Supreme Court cases
concerning the scope of the Exception and explicitly stated its desire to
codify the rule set forth in those cases. In addition, the Committee cited
two law review commentaries on the Exception. The article and student
130. Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (effective date July 1, 1975).
131. See, e.g., 117 CONG. REC. 33,642, 33,646-47 (1971) (letter from Senator McClellan to Judge
Maris) (objecting that proposed version of Exception "follows uncritically the 'accepted pattern"' and
advocating that its scope be "enlarged"). The provision was enacted as proposed, without the change
suggested by Senator McClellan.
132. For example, in United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 230-32 (2d Cir. 1950), the Second
Circuit considered whether certain statements were properly admitted pursuant to the Exception.
Judge Learned Hand concluded that when confederates who had engaged in lawful conduct continued
the conduct after it was criminalized, statements made in furtherance of the effort were admissible
even if made when the project was legal. Id. at 231-32. Once some criminal conduct occurred, the
pendency of the conspiracy was found to extend back to the beginning of the project. Id. An inquiry
concerning lawful projects transformed into crimes would have been unnecessary had all lawful
ventures been within the Exception. Id.; see Joseph H. Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy: A
Reexamination of the Co-Conspirators' Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 52 MICH. L. REV. I159, 1 172,
1177 (1954) (discussing "support for admitting declarations made during a legal venture which
subsequently turns illegal"); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 382-83 (4th ed. '95') (defining
"conspiracy" as an agreement to pursue illegal aims).
'33. FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee's note.
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comment cited concern themselves throughout with criminal
conspiracies. The comment begins, "The conspiracy charge, long
established as an important weapon of prosecution, has lately been
subject to severe judicial and scholarly criticism. However, there has
been little discussion of the rule of evidence which plays so large a part in
the effectiveness of the charge-the co-conspirators' hearsay
exception."' 34 It then goes on to discuss the "illegal ends" that
conspirators agree to pursue,'35 and it explores the analogy of the
"vicarious criminal responsibility of co-conspirators for acts in
furtherance" to "their vicarious evidential responsibility for declarations
in furtherance."3 6 In short, an assumption of criminal design pervades
the entire review of the "conspiracy" exception.
The other article cited is no different; it justifies the Exception in
part on the need to convict dangerous criminal conspirators. After
surveying various justifications advanced, the author concludes that
"'[t]he true reason for the exception ... is simple: there is great probative
need for such testimony. Conspiracy is a hard thing to prove. The
substantive law of conspiracy has vastly expanded. This created a tension
solved by relaxation in the law of evidence.""' The existing evidence
codes cited in the Advisory Committee note are, if possible, even worse
for the revisionist camp. The note referred to the analogous California
rule, which it described as a "similarly limited provision[]." Section 1223
of the California Evidence Code, which became law in 1967, reads:
"Evidence of a statement offered against a party is not made
inadmissible by the hearsay rule if: (a) The statement was made by the
declarant while participating in a conspiracy to commit a crime or civil
wrong and in furtherance of the objective of that conspiracy. . . .8
Similarly, the New Jersey rule, then numbered Rule 63(9)(b),"' declared
that a "statement which would be admissible if made by the declarant at
the hearing is admissible against a party if ... at the time the statement
was made the party and the declarant were participating in a plan to
commit a crime or civil wrong and the statement was made in furtherance
of that plan."' 40 The Uniform Rule of Evidence, with which the note asks
readers to compare the California and New Jersey provisions, would
134. Comment, The Hearsay Exception for Co-Conspirators' Declarations, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 530,
530-31 (1958) (footnotes omitted).
135. Id. at 537.
136. Id. at 538-39.
137. See Levie, supra note 132, at I166. Levies "relaxation in the law of evidence" refers to the
Exception itself, not to any expansion of it to cover lawful combinations.
138. CAL. EvID. CODE§ 1223 (West 1995) (emphasis added).
139. The rule now appears at N.J. R. EviD. 8o3(b)(5) (west 2o1o).
140. N.J. R. EVID. 63(9) (5967) (emphasis added); see also State v. Phelps. 476 A.2d "199' 1203 n.2
(N.J. 1984) (discussing history of New Jersey rule and stating that drafters limited it to statements "in
furtherance of the illegal plan"); State v. Boiardo, 268 A.2d 55, 59 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 5970).
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have required only that a declaration be "relevant" to a conspiracy
(rather than "in furtherance" of it);' 4' this broader formulation was
rejected.'42 In short, the Advisory Committee note, often cited to support
the revisionist position, actually bolsters the traditional view that the
Exception covers only unlawful activity.
Similarly, the legislative history contained in congressional
committee reports provides no indication that those voting for the
Federal Rules intended Rule 8o1(d)(2)(E) to cover statements made in
furtherance of lawful ends. Courts have cited the Report of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary,'43 but context reveals that the phrases
cherry-picked from the report provide no support for the revisionist
interpretation. The Senate Report discussion of the Exception states in
its entirety:
The House approved the long-accepted rule that "a statement by a
coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy" is not hearsay as it was submitted by the Supreme Court.
While the rule refers to a coconspirator, it is this committee's
understanding that the rule is meant to carry forward the universally
accepted doctrine that a joint venturer is considered as a coconspirator
for the purposes of this rule even though no conspiracy has been
charged. United States v. Rinaldi, 393 F.2d 97, 99 (2d Cir.), cert denied
393 U.S. 913 (1968); United States v. Spencer, 415 F.2d 1301, 1304 (7th
Cir., 1969).144
The words "joint venture," music to revisionist ears, allow the initial
misconception that no criminal act is required to create a "conspiracy"
under the Exception. Not so. What the Senate Report makes clear is that
despite the explicit inclusion of the word "conspiracy" in the codified
Exception, the drafters did not intend to limit the scope of the Exception
to charged conspiracies. Under Rule 8o1(d)(2)(E), a "conspiracy" may
be uncharged, but it must still be a conspiracy. The two cases cited in the
Senate Report make clear that lawful conduct was not on the legislative
agenda. In United States v. Rinaldi, which concerned a conspiracy to lie
to immigration officers, the Second Circuit wrote,
The testimony concerning what was said in the hearing room in the
absence of Rinaldi was properly received as Lentini and Rinaldi were
engaged in an illegal joint enterprise, which makes statements by any
141. UNIF. R. EvID. 63(9)(b) (1953).
142. See 117 CONG. REC. 33,642, 33,647 (1971) (letter from Senator McClellan to Judge Maris)
(quoting approvingly professor who supported the interpretation of the Exception embodied in the
Uniform Rules, instead of that in the California and New Jersey rules, which the Advisory Committee
had preferred).
143. E.g., United States v. Gewin, 471 F.3d '97, 20l (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting that in a previous
case, the court "quoted the 1974 Senate Advisory Committee note to Rule 8ol(d)(2)(E)"), United
States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 886 n.41 (5th Cir. 1979) (stating that "the agreement need not be
criminal in nature," and quoting "the legislative history of rule 801(d)(2)(E)").
'44. 5. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 26-27 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7o51, 7073.
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member of the venture admissible against the others and each of them,
whether or not a conspiracy is charged. 45
In United States v. Spencer, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a conviction for
the possession and sale of heroin.46
It is hardly open to question but that defendant and Davis were
engaged in a common enterprise, with the objective of dealing in and
disposing of narcotics. There was evidence that Davis negotiated to sell
heroin to Boyles upon terms and conditions of sale dictated by
defendant. Pursuant to such arrangement, Davis transferred money to
defendant and received from him the quantity of heroin that Davis had
agreed to procure for Boyles. Defendant's acts of receiving money
from Davis and delivering the heroin are proof of his participation in
the joint criminal venture.
If revisionists seek support for the expansion of the Exception to cover
lawful joint ventures, they will find nothing helpful in the legislative
history.
Another article, published after the initial drafting of the Federal
Rules of Evidence but before their enactment, further rebuts the claim
that Rule 8oJ(d)(2)(E) means what federal prosecutors now argue. In
1972, Norman Garland and Donald Snow released The Co-Conspirators
Exception to the Hearsay Rule: Procedural Implementation and
Confrontation Clause Requirements.4' As if to demonstrate the centrality
of criminal conduct to those considering the proper scope of the
Exception, the article begins with various definitions of the phrase
"criminal conspiracy."" The authors then analogize the scope of the
substantive crime of conspiracy to that of the Exception,'50 and they later,
like the authors cited by the Advisory Committee, state that "[o]ne
justification offered in support of the co-conspirators exception is that,
because the crime of conspiracy is difficult to prove, a co-conspirator's"
words are necessary."' Finally, they warn that absent Supreme Court
guidance, practitioners cannot know when the Exception's use might
violate the Confrontation Clause. 52
4. Recent Decisions Construing the Exception
Since the enactment of the Federal Rules, the Supreme Court has
revisited the Exception in a few key cases, clarifying the acceptable
method for deciding what evidence satisfies the Exception, and also
145. 393 F.2d 97, 99 (2d Cir. 1968) (emphasis added).
146. 415 F.2d 1301, 1305 (7th Cir. 1969).
147. Id. at 1304 (emphasis added).
148. Garland & Snow, supra note I13.
149. See id. at i & nn.5-6.
150. Id. at 2-3 & 1.23.
i5i. Id. at 5. They do not actually state that the Exception cannot apply to lawful conduct. Had
that question been up for debate, however, it seems quite likely they would have mentioned it.
i52. Id. at 14-15, 22.
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musing on the Exception's place in the Court's changing Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence. Ohio v. Roberts-a landmark Confrontation
Clause decision that sharply limited the admissibility of hearsay at
criminal trials, even pursuant to hearsay exceptions' 5 - could have been
read as holding that the Sixth Amendment requires unavailability of the
declarant in order to admit statements under the Coconspirator
Exception. The Court, however, rejected this reading in United States v.
Inadi, holding that the Exception does not require unavailability.5 4 The
Court found that coconspirator hearsay, unlike other forms, is not
reproducible and derives significance from the circumstances in which it
is made; accordingly, the principles of best evidence do not mandate an
in-court reenactment of such statements.'
Just one year later, the Court decided Bourjaily v. United States, in
which it set forth three rules governing the admission of statements
under the Exception."' First, trial courts may admit statements only if the
admitting party can show by a preponderance of the evidence that a
conspiracy existed.' The Court noted that this inquiry is completely
separate from any evaluation of the merits of the underlying case.'
Second, the statement itself may be considered as evidence supporting
admissibility."' The Court held that the proffered statement could be
used as a part of the decision concerning admissibility but reserved
judgment on whether such statements could be viewed as sufficient for
admissibility in and of themselves."' Third, the trial court need not
inquire into independent indicia of reliability for coconspirator hearsay
statements. 6, In other words, the Exception allowing admission of
coconspirator statements is "firmly enough rooted" that Roberts does not
require any additional indicia of reliability. 6' The Court explained in a
footnote that although its decision abolished the "bootstrapping rule,"'63
153. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
154. 475 U.S. 387, 394-95 (1986).
155. Id. at 395.
156. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
157. Id. at 175-76.
158. Id. at 175 ("[T]he evidentiary standard is unrelated to the burden of proof on the substantive
issues, be it a criminal case or a civil case." (citation omitted)).
159. Id. at 18o-81.
16o. Id. A 1997 amendment to the Federal Rules subsequently resolved this matter, stating, "The
contents of the statement shall be considered but are not alone sufficient to establish the declarant's
authority." FED. R. EVID. 8oI(d)(2)(E) (amended 1997).
161. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 176, 182.
i62. Id. at 183.
163. The rule against "bootstrapping" had prohibited using the proffered coconspirator testimony
to prove the admissibility of the statements themselves, by using them to show existence of a
conspiracy, the membership of relevant parties in the conspiracy, or that the statements were made in
furtherance of that conspiracy; the Court required that the conspiracy be proved entirely by
independent evidence. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 701 & n.i4 (1974); see also Hitchman
Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 249 (1917) ("[I]t is necessary to show by independent
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it did not remove coconspirator hearsay from the "firmly rooted"
classification.164
The most significant recent decision with the potential to affect the
Exception is Crawford v. Washington.'6 5 This case, explained in more
detail in Part V.B, overruled Ohio v. Roberts by holding that for
"testimonial" hearsay, the only sufficient indicia of reliability is cross-
examination.166 Crawford mentioned the Coconspirator Exception twice,
making it clear that statements admitted thereunder will not be affected
because of their nontestimonial nature.' By saying this, the Court has
effectively created a bright-line rule holding that coconspirator
statements are always nontestimonial.6 s As a result, the majority of the
circuits have held that coconspirator statements are nontestimonial and
therefore do not receive special review under the rules handed down in
Crawford."' For example, the Seventh Circuit stated, "As to the
Confrontation Clause argument, Crawford does not apply. The
recordings featured the statements of co-conspirators. These statements,
by definition, are not hearsay. Crawford did not change the rules as to
the admissibility of co-conspirator statements."'70 Accordingly, Crawford,
especially viewed alongside Bourjaily, has no real effect on the
Exception as long as coconspirator statements continue to be categorized
as non-testimonial. Michael Seigel and Daniel Weisman argue against
this bright-line rule and its effects, suggesting that it is unnecessary and
evidence that there was a combination between [declarants] and defendants, but it is not necessary to
show by independent evidence that the combination was criminal or otherwise unlawful. The element
of illegality may be shown by the declarations themselves."). The Court overturned this rule in 1987 in
Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 177-81, allowing the statements themselves to be considered during all inquiries
concerning their admissibility.
164. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 184 n.4. The tension is that a newly-defined hearsay exception can
hardly be "firmly rooted."
165. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
166. Id. at 51, 55-56 ("testimonial" statements, as distinguished from more casual remarks, include
"ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-that is, material such as affidavits, custodial
examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial
statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially" (quoting Brief for
Petitioner at 23, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL 21939940, at *23)). "Indicia of
reliability" refer to factors that, under Roberts but not under Crawford, allowed the admission of
certain hearsay absent cross-examination. Id. at 68-69.
167. Id. at 56, 59 l.9.
168. See Seigel & Weisman, supra note 102, at 879. The discussions of the Exception in Crawford
were, of course, obiter dicta.
169. See United States v. Ramirez, 479 F-3d 1229, 1249 n.12 (ioth Cir. 2007): United States v.
Bobb, 471 F.3d 491, 499 (3d Cir. 2oo6); United States v. Underwood, 446 F.3d 1340, 1347 (Iith Cir.
2oo6); United States v. Hansen, 434 F.3d 92, 100 (Ist Cir. 2oo6); United States v. Allen, 425 F.3d 1231.
1235 (9th Cir. 2oo5); United States v. Jenkins, 419 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Logan, 419 F.3d 172, 178 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Franklin, 415 F.3d 537, 545-46 (6th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Delgado, 4o1 F.3d 290, 299 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Lee. 374 F.3d 637, 644
(8th Cir. 2004).
170. Jenkins, 419F.-3d at 618.
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should be replaced with a rule under which certain statements would
continue to be admitted but the results of sustained questioning by an
undercover agent would be barred by the Confrontation Clause as
interpreted in Crawford."'
II. CURRENT PRACTICE IN THE TRIAL COURTS AND RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS
The absence of Supreme Court guidance on two key questions-
first, the precise method of deciding how evidence should be admitted
under the Exception, and second, whether a venture neither illegal nor
illicit may qualify as a "conspiracy"-has allowed the development of
diverse practice among the various federal circuits, and occasionally
within the same circuit. This Part provides an overview of the process by
which trial courts decide what evidence to admit under the Exception. It
then reviews some troubling recent developments as it surveys the case
law concerning whether a "conspiracy" must violate the law (or, at a
minimum, social norms) before the proponent of otherwise inadmissible
hearsay may invoke the Exception.
A. DECISIONS To ADMIT PARTICULAR COCONSPIRATOR STATEMENTS
In a footnote in Bourfaily, the Court asserted that it does "not
express an opinion on the proper order of proof that trial courts should
follow in concluding that the preponderance standard has been satisfied
in an ongoing trial."' 2 The district and circuit courts have therefore been
left to their own devices in creating a workable and fair process by which
coconspirator statements may be admitted." After the Federal Rules of
Evidence became law in 1975, the First Circuit had one of the earliest
chances to examine the codified Exception, deciding the frequently-cited
United States v. Petrozziello in 1977.174 Although portions of this opinion
have been overruled,'7 5 the basic structure for the admission of evidence
under Rules 8oI(d)(2)(E) and 1o4(b)1 6 remains intact.177 The court held
that a trial judge should admit coconspirator statements when it is "more
likely than not that the declarant and the defendant were members of a
171. Seigel & Weisman, supra note 102, at 903-04.
172. 483 U.S. 171, 176 n.i (1987).
173. Before 1975, the decision of admissibility was sometimes left up to the jury. See United States
v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 22 (ist Cir. 1977). The Federal Rules shifted that responsibility to the trial
judge. See id. at 20, 22 & n.i.
'74. Id. at 23.
'75. See United States v. Goldberg, 405 F.3d 770, 775-76 (Ist Cir. '997).
176. Rule 1o4(b) states: "when the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a
condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to
support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition."~
177. See United States v. Castellini, 392 F.3d 35, 49-53 (Ist Cir. 2004) (applying Petrozziello to
evaluate claim that statements were improperly admitted pursuant to Rule 80I(d)(2)(E)).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
conspiracy when the hearsay statement was made, and that the statement
was in furtherance of the conspiracy."' 78
There has been debate within and among circuits about whether the
trial judge must make this determination at a pretrial hearing or if she
may reserve this determination until the close of evidence, instructing the
jury to ignore portions of testimony that the court chooses not to admit.
In the Fifth and Tenth Circuits, for example, a "James hearing""' is
preferred, but coconspirator testimony may also be admitted on
"forthcoming proof of a 'predicate conspiracy through trial testimony or
other evidence.""o While the circuits do not agree on the precise order
of proof and the exact standard for admissibility, in general the party
attempting to offer the evidence (nearly always the prosecution) must
provide some proof independent of the proffered statements themselves
that a conspiracy exists, that the declarant and the party against whom
the statement will be used were both members of the conspiracy, that the
statements were made before the primary objectives of the conspiracy
failed or were achieved, and that the statements were made in
furtherance of the conspiracy. The trial judge then determines whether it
is "more likely than not" that all of these requirements have been
satisfied and decides whether to let the jury hear the statements, or-if
the jury has already heard the testimony-whether to instruct that the
jury should disregard certain statements.
B. THE OBJECT OF A "CONSPIRACY"-TROUBLING RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Against this backdrop of varied practice for determining what
statements satisfy the requirements of Rule 8o1(d)(2)(E), in recent years
certain federal prosecutors have advanced a revised definition of the
Exception itself, arguing that the "conspiracy" joined by the defendant
and declarant need not "have as its object an unlawful purpose."82 fIn
178. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d at 23.
179. A "James hearing" is a pretrial hearing at the conclusion of which the court rules on the
admissibility of tendered coconspirator declarations using the preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard. See United States v. Ricks, 639 F.2d 1305, 1309 (5th Cir. '98').
18o. United States v. Townley, 472 F.3d 1267, 1273 (ioth Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v.
Owens,7o F.3d II18, 1223 (ioth Cir. 1995)).
181. The myriad differences among the practice in the several circuits are discussed in greater
depth in Ethel R. Alston, Annotation, Admissibility of Statement by Co-Conspirator Under Rule
8o(d) (2) (E) of Federal Rules of Evidence, 44 A.L.R. FED.627 (1979) (updated 2olo).
182. E.g., Letter Reply Brief of United States, supra note i; Government's Opposition to
Defendant's Motion to Strike Exhibits and Exclude Witnesses at 6, 9-io, United States v. Ring, 628 F
Supp. 2d 195 (D.D.C. Sept. 7, 2009) (No. i:o8-CR-274), 2009 WL 2956731 ("[]f the Court finds that
the evidence does not establish by a preponderance that Coughlin joined the Count I conspiracy, it
certainly establishes that Ring and Coughlin acted together in furtherance of a lawful joint
enterprise."); United States' Motion in Limine for Admission of Certain Statements from E-mail and
Other Correspondence at 3-4, United States v. Stevens, 593 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2008)
(No. :o8-CR-23 I), 2008 WL 4498621 ("The joint enterprise need not be illegal, rather out-of-court
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other words, government lawyers contend that a "conspiracy" may, for
purposes of the Exception, involve purely lawful, even laudable, conduct.
In United States v. Schiff, for instance, federal prosecutors in New Jersey
wrote, "The defendant's main contention is that the conspiracy or joint
venture shown for purposes of Federal Rule of Evidence 8o1(d)(2)(E)
'must have as its object an unlawful purpose.' The law, however, is to the
contrary."' References to "joint ventures" recur in the government's
revisionist pleadings. Prosecutors in the Southern District of New York
contend, for example, that "the objective of the joint venture that
justifies deeming the speaker as the agent of the defendant need not be
criminal at all."'S Some courts have accepted the revisionist
interpretation, stating that a lawful "joint venture" can trigger the
Exception.185I use the word "stating," as opposed to "holding,"
advisedly. Although a few courts have stated that lawful activities may
constitute "conspiracies," instances of courts admitting under the
Exception statements made in furtherance of lawful objectives resist
diligent efforts to find them. In United States v. Russo, the case quoted by
the Southern District prosecutors just mentioned, the Second Circuit
wrote that "the defendant and the declarant were involved together in a
conspiracy to maintain an organized crime syndicate." 86 After writing the
quoted dictum, the court cited two cases, one involving "statements by a
corrections officer in [a] prisoner's civil rights action under Section 1983
statements made in furtherance of a lawful joint enterprise may be admitted as nonhearsay."). In a
subsequent brief in Senator Stevens's case, prosecutors wrote that statements should be admitted
because the declarant and defendant "collaborated closely and over a long period of time on
renovating defendant's chalet." Government's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for a New Trial at 2,
United States v. Stevens, No. i:o8-CR-23 I (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 2oo9), 2oo9 WL 192240. More recently,
prosecutors in the Northern District of New York argued in preparation for an "honest services" trial
of State Senator Joseph Bruno, "In view of Bruno's contractual associations with [various businesses],
documents of those entities, as well as oral statements made by their representatives, are admissible
pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 8o1(d)(2)(E) as co-conspirator statements." Government's Trial
Memorandum at 14-15, United States v. Bruno, No. o9-CR-o29 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 5,2009).
183. Letter Reply Brief of United States, supra note i (citation omitted) (quoting Defendant's
February 19, 2oo8 Response Brief at 3, United States v. Schiff, 538 F. Supp. 2d 818 (D.N.J. 2008)
(Crim. No. o6-4o6)).
184. Government's Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion in Limine at io--II, United
States v. Stein, 488 F. Supp. 2d 370 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2007) (SI 05 Crim. 888), 2007 WL 1833480
(quoting United States v. Russo, 32o F.3d 37, 45 (2d Cir. 2oo2)). The prosecution's argument conflates,
at least in part, the Coconspirator Exception and the principal-agent exception. As is discussed infra
Part IV.A, if the declarant truly had been the defendant's "agent" when uttering the statements at
issue, the prosecution would not need the Coconspirator Exception at all.
185. See, e.g., United States v. Gewin, 471 F.3d i97, 200, 201 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (rejecting
defendant's claim "that Rule 8ol(d)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires, before
admission of co-conspirators' out-of-court statements, a showing of an unlawful conspiracy, not merely
action in concert toward a common goal" because circuit "precedents hold that the doctrine is not
limited to unlawful combinations").
186. 302 F.3d at 46. The 'joint venture" at issue for certain statements deemed admissible was "a
conspiracy to operate the Colombo family." Id. at 46 fl.3.
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alleging officers participated in or encouraged assault by other
inmates,"'87 and the other a "scheme to rig bids on [New York State]
contracts."' 8 Prosecutors can now find choice quotable phrases among
the opinions of various respected courts, increasing the odds that dicta
will one day become holding.
In addition to those of the Second Circuit, statements endorsing the
revisionist interpretation of the Exception appear in opinions of the
Courts of Appeals for the Third,'"' Fifth," Seventh,"' Ninth, 92 Tenth,'93
and District of Columbia'94 Circuits, as well as a few trial courts.'" The
D.C. Circuit's opinion in United States v. Gewin demonstrates how a
court can state that the revisionist interpretation of the Exception is good
law without actually so holding.'9 6 In Gewin, the Court of Appeals
rejected the defendant-appellant's claim that the trial court improperly
admitted coconspirator statements without expressly finding that the
187. Id. at 45 (citing Fischl v. Armitage, 128 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1997)). The government brief also
cites a treatise that itself relies on Russo. See Government's Memorandum of Law in Support of Its
Motion in Limine, supra note 184.
188. Russo, 302 F.3d at 45 (citing New York v. Hendrickson Bros., 84o F.2d io65, 1o73-74 (2d Cir.
1988)).
189. See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 262 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that it
would be error to require "a showing not only that there was a combination between the defendants,
but also that the combination was unlawful"), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). The statements concerned "a conspiracy to fix low
prices in the United States" in violation of the Sherman Act. Id. at 263 n.32; see infra notes 204-13 and
accompanying text (discussing this case in greater detail).
190. See United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 886 n.41 (5th Cir. 1979) (stating that "the agreement
need not be criminal in nature" and quoting "the legislative history of rule 8o1(d)(2)(E)"). The
statements at issue were entries in the logbook of the ship used by defendants to smuggle eight
thousand pounds of marijuana. Id. at 867-68. Portions of the logbook were thrown overboard as the
Coast Guard approached the ship. Id. at 890.
191. See United States v. Kelley, 864 F.2d 569, 573 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. Coe, 718
F.2d 830, 835 (7th Cir. 1983)) ("Rule 8oi(d)(2)(E) applies not only to conspiracies but also to joint
ventures . . . ."); Coe, 718 F.2d at 835-38 & n.3 (rejecting, in a civil case, the theory "that the
government must establish that the conspiracy or joint venture was illegal before the coconspirator
hearsay exception may be invoked" and stating that the law "simply requir[es] that the statements
relate to the crime charged in a criminal case"). Kelley concerned a prosecution for "willfully assisting
others in filing false income tax returns." 864 F.2d at 570-71.
192. See United States v. Layton, 855 F.2d 1388, 1398-14oo (9th Cir. 1988), see also infra notes
215-29 and accompanying text (discussing Layton in greater detail).
193. See United States v. Bucaro, 8ol F.2d 1230, 1231-32 (roth Cir. 1986) (declaring that object
need not be illegal after detailing how declarant made statements in furtherance of his and defendant's
cocaine distribution plan).
194. See United States v. Gewin, 471 F-3d 197, 200-02 (D.C. Cir. 2oo6).
195. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 85 F. Supp. 2d 1o47, 1079 (D. Kan. 1999) (rejecting
defendants' argument that the Exception "requires the government to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence not only that the declarants were involved in a joint venture, but also that they were
involved in a criminal conspiracy" (footnote omitted)). The case concerned a scheme to collect fees in
exchange for referral of Medicare patients, in violation of the Medicare Anti-Kickback Act. Id. at
1o52-53; see infra notes 260-65 and accompanying text (discussing Anderson in greater detail).
196. See 471 F.3d 197.
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activity conducted by the defendant and declarant was illegal.'97
Declaring that "such a showing was not required," the Court of Appeals
stated that "the district court properly admitted out-of-court statements
upon finding a lawful joint enterprise."'98 The entire discussion, however,
is dicta because the "enterprise" at issue was a "'pump and dump'
scheme" wherein the defendant and his coconspirators "pumped up the
share price through a campaign of strategically-timed, fraudulent press
releases, and sold its holdings into the artificially inflated market." 99 it
appears that the appellate court, perhaps convinced by prior dicta that
the revisionist interpretation was circuit law," refused Gewin's request
that it require that the trial court find the underlying "conspiracy" to be
illegal before admitting the statements.2 0' The Court of Appeals, rather
than finding from the record that the "pump and dump" scheme for
which Gewin was convicted obviously had an illegal aim, decided instead
to opine that no such finding was required.202 Government lawyers have
begun citing Gewin in their efforts to have its construction of the
Exception adopted elsewhere."
The Third Circuit purported to rely on Supreme Court precedent
when stating that a "conspiracy" under the Exception need not be
illegal.04 Parties in a civil case had objected that the trial court failed to
197. Id. at 201-02.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 198.
200. A prior Court of Appeals opinion concerning the Exception had stated, "Although Rule
8ol(d)(2)(E) refers to 'conspiracy' and statements of a 'coconspirator,' its use of those terms is not
intended to limit applicability of the doctrine to unlawful combinations. .. ." United States v. Weisz,
718 F.2d 413, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The "combination" in Weisz was a conspiracy to bribe a United
States Congressman. Id. at 416. Counsel for Gewin duly noted that Weisz and other cases cited by the
government "do not support the claimed proposition, much less establish the law of the Circuit," Final
Reply Brief of Appellant Barry W. Gewin at I2, Gewin, 471 F-3d 197 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 27, 2oo6) (No.
05-3086), 2006 WL 1197220, to no avail.
20I. Gewin, 471 F.3d at 200 ("The [district] court rejected Gewin's claim, renewed here, that Rule
8oi(d)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires, before admission of co-conspirators' out-of-
court statements, a showing of an unlawful conspiracy, not merely action in concert toward a common
goal.").
202. Id. at 201-02. The D.C. Circuit recently piled further dicta upon that in Gewin by citing it to
support the "admission of statements by individuals acting in furtherance of a lawful joint enterprise"
in United States v. Brockenborrugh, 575 F.3d 726, 735 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The "joint enterprise" at issue
in Brockenborrugh was an attempt to steal a parcel of real property, a scheme that included the
impersonation of a United States Marshal and the filing of a false deed with the District of Columbia
Recorder of Deeds. Id. at 730-32.
203. See, e.g., Letter Reply Brief of United States, supra note I, at -2; SEC's Trial Brief & Motion
Pursuant to FRE 8o1(d)(2)(A) & (E) to Admit Defendant Jordan's Prior Testimony into Evidence
Against All Defendants at 5-6, SEC v. Pietrzak, No. I:o3-CV-1507 (N.D. Ill. July i6, 2007), 2007 WL
4994098.
204. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 262 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing Hitchman
Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 249 (1917)), rev'd on other grounds sub norn. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)
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require that a venture be unlawful before admitting evidence under Rule
8oi (d)(2)(E). 205 The Court of Appeals held that
[i]f the trial court had so ruled, that ruling would be error, for in order
to admit coconspirator statements "it is necessary to show by
independent evidence that there was a combination between
them, . .. but it is not necessary to show by independent evidence that
the combination was criminal or otherwise unlawful."D
Because the language quoted by the Court of Appeals appears in
Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, a Supreme Court opinion
construing the Exception," the revisionists might initially appear to
stand on firm ground. If anything, however, Hitchman Coal undermines
the revisionist position. The objection at issue in that case was that
certain hearsay statements were "not admissible because the existence of
a criminal or unlawful conspiracy is not made to appear by evidence
aliunde.""20 The Supreme Court responded with the text quoted by the
Third Circuit. The holding of Hitchman Coal is not that the "conspiracy"
may be lawful but rather that one must have "independent evidence"-
that is, evidence other than the coconspirator statements the proponent
desires to admit under the Exception -showing that the declarant and
the defendant were in "a combination." Further, "independent evidence"
is not needed to "show . . . that the combination was criminal or
otherwise unlawful.")2 09 The latter point is worth mentioning only if the
proponent must show, in one way or another, that the combination was
criminal or otherwise unlawful. Hitchman Coal accordingly set forth that
the proponent may use the hearsay statements themselves to
demonstrate the "illegal" nature of the conspiracy, but only if he can
show with independent evidence that a combination exists.2 0 The
decision surely did not dispense with the need for an illegal object.
Indeed, the sentence that immediately follows the text quoted by the
Third Circuit is, "[t]he element of illegality may be shown by the
declarations themselves."2"' A number of courts have understood that
205. Id.
206. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Hitchnan Coal, 245 U.S. at 249).
207. 245 U.S. at 249.
208. Id. "Evidence aliunde" is the same as "extrinsic evidence," meaning "it comes from other
sources." See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 81-82 (8th ed. 2004). For purposes of the Exception. "from
other sources" means from sources other than the proffered statements themselves.
209. Hitchman Coal, 245 U.S. at 249.
2io. The rule as stated in Hitchman Coal is no longer good law. A court now may consider the
statements themselves to determine whether a combination existed among the declarant and
defendant, although the statements cannot prove the conspiracy's existence by themselves. See
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 177-81 (1987); see also supra notes 158-60 and accompanying
text.
211I. Hitchman Coal, 245 U.S. at 249. To give the Third Circuit its due, the Hitchmnan Coal Court
confused matters somewhat by musing, after mentioning the need to prove the "element of illegality,"
on the origin of the Exception:
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while Hitchman Coal required different forms of proof for a conspiracy's
existence and its purpose, the Supreme Court did not abolish what it
called the "element of illegality.""' Prosecutors supporting the revisionist
interpretation of the Exception have misread Hitchman Coal in the same
way as the Third Circuit; 2 13 courts reviewing such arguments should be
sure they are not misled by selective quotations."
The Ninth Circuit has also announced its support for the revisionist
interpretation: "The novel question before us is whether the common
enterprise or joint venture must have an illegal objective. The rationale
underlying Rule 8o1(d)(2)(E) supports the conclusion. . that the
common enterprise need not have an illegal objective."' As it happens,
however, the court's detailed discussion of the question hardly seems
necessary to the result. The defendant, Laurence John Layton, shot two
people during the catastrophic visit of Congressman Leo Ryan to the
"Peoples Temple" compound of Jim Jones in the Republic of Guyana.21 6
Ryan had organized a trip to the compound, known as "Jonestown," in
It depends upon the principle that when any number of persons associate themselves
together in the prosecution of a common plan or enterprise, lawful or unlawful, from the
very act of association there arises a kind of partnership, each member being constituted the
agent of all, so that the act or declaration of one, in furtherance of the common object, is the
act of all, and is admissible as primary and original evidence against them.
Id. In theory, the reference to an "enterprise, lawful or unlawful" might suggest that legal
combinations fall within the scope of the Exception. More likely, the Court's analogy to agency
theory-which mostly concerns lawful activity-was not meant to nullify the Court's statement
concerning how a proponent may prove the "element of illegality."
212. See United States v. Jackson, 627 F.2d 1198, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("What must be proved by
independent evidence is merely that a combination existed between the third parties and the
defendant. It is not necessary to show by such evidence that the combination was unlawful. That
element may be shown by the hearsay declarations and may be shown after proof of the existence of
the combination." (citing Hitchman Coal, 245 U.S. at 249-50)); Braatelien v. United States, 147 F.2d
888, 893 (8th Cir. 1945) ("Declarations of a conspirator, however, made in the absence of an objecting
defendant, can not be admitted against him when independent evidence is lacking to show the
existence of the conspiracy and defendant's connection with it, but it is not necessary to show by
independent evidence that the conspiracy was criminal or otherwise unlawful." (citing Hitchman Coal,
245 U.S. at 249)); see also United States v. Coe, 718 F.2d 830, 835-36 & n-3 (7th Cir. 1983) (suggesting
that the "conspiracy" need not be illegal, but not suggesting that Hitchman Coal commands such a
holding); United States v. Craig, 522 F.2d 29, 31 & n.2 (6th Cir. 1975).
213. See, e.g., Government's Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion in Limine, supra note
184, at 12; Final Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 200, at I1-14.
214. The confusion found in briefs and judicial opinions is reflected in at least one treatise
collecting the conflicting authority. See DAVID F. BINDER, HEARSAY HANDBOOK § 35.10 (4th ed. 2009).
The treatise states: "That the purpose of the agency relationship was unlawful, i.e., that it was
conspiratorial, may be proved by the assertion itself, though this should be without evidential
consequence." Id. (citing Hitchman Coal, 245 U.S. at 249, United States v. Gewin, 471 F.3d 197, 2on2
(D.C. Cir. 2006), and United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 886 n.4s (5th Cir. 19'79), among other cases).
why something "without evidential consequence" would be proved is not explained. For further
discussion of Postal, see infra note 259.
215. United States v. Layton, 85 F.2d 5388, 5398 (9th Cir. 5988).
216. Id. at 1392-94-
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response to complaints that residents suffered poor living conditions and
mistreatment.' 7 Before Ryan's arrival, Jones made multiple speeches
intimating that Ryan would not escape Jonestown alive, saying among
other things that "if he stays long enough for tea he's gonna regret it.""2 8
After Ryan's arrival, Layton informed the delegation that he wished to
leave and, despite concern among other departing residents "that Layton
was merely feigning his desire to leave and that his true intent was to
harm those departing from the settlement," was allowed onto one of the
delegation's two aircraft, on which he shot two passengers during its
attempted takeoff."' Around the same time, Ryan was shot dead by
Peoples Temple members attacking the other aircraft. 22 0
Despite evidence showing that Layton and Jones had agreed upon
an illegal objective-many potential aims spring to mind-of which
Jones's threatening speeches might be found to have furthered, the trial
court held instead that the defendant and declarant were engaged in "a
conspiracy, or common enterprise, to conceal from Congressman Ryan
the truth about the conditions at Jonestown.",2 ' The Court of Appeals
agreed and, based on its conclusion that the joint enterprise need not
violate any law, found no error in the admission of the tape recorded
speeches.' Surely the prosecution could have shown by a preponderance
of the evidence that Layton, who "had been a member of the
[Jonestown] security force,"22 ' had entered into an illegal combination
with Jones and that Jones furthered their joint objectives with his
speeches.224 If Layton and Jones jointly pursued an illegal aim, the entire
examination of the Exception's scope is dicta."
217. Id. at 1393.
218. Id. at 1401. Jones also said, "I want to shoot someone in the ass like him so bad, so long, I'm
not passing this opportunity up. Now if they come in, they come in on their own risk." Id.
219. Id. at 1393-94.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1400.
222. Id. at 14oo-ol. At Layton's first American trial, which ended in a hung jury, the trial judge
refused to admit the statements. See United States v. Layton, 720 F.2d 548, 555 (9th Cir. 1983). The
prosecution took an interlocutory appeal before the second trial, and the Court of Appeals announced
that Jones's speeches were made in furtherance of a conspiracy to kill Ryan. Id. at 554-58. The ruling
at issue in the postconviction appeal discussed above followed the interlocutory appeal. See Layton,
855 F.2d at 1397.
223. Layton, 855 F.2d at 1393.
224. See Katherine Bishop, 1978 Cult Figure Gets Life Term in Congressman's Jungle Slaying, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 1987, at A13 ("[T]he Government contended that Mr. Layton conspired with Mr. Jones
and other cult members to kill the Congressman and others in his group to prevent them from
returning to the United States with negative reports about Jonestown."). Recall also that if one joins
an existing conspiracy, he becomes "on the hook" for statements made in furtherance of it before he
joined. See infra note 277. Accordingly, so long as Jones had conspired with anyone to attack the
Congressman's delegation, Layton would be deemed to have "ratified" Jones's statements as soon as
he agreed to board the rescue aircraft and shoot passengers.
225. See Pierre N. Leval. Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 8i N.Y.U. L. REv.
3249, 3257-58 (20o6) ("A judge's power to bind is limited to the issue that is before himz he cannot
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The alternative, that Layton and Jones had no illegal objective that
Jones's inflammatory speeches can be said to have furthered, highlights
the intuitive wrongness of the revisionist position. If we assume that
Layton and Jones had entered no illegal conspiracy, and Layton had no
illegal intentions whatsoever when Jones uttered the threatening
speeches, then why should Layton's jury hear the damning remarks?6
The court's theory would seem to be that "[i]f the appropriate basis for
admitting the statements of a confederate is that his participation in a
common enterprise with the defendant makes him an agent of the
accused, then the goal or objective of the common enterprise would
appear to be irrelevant."" But even the most talented prosecutor could
not have convinced a United States district judge that Jim Jones, the cult
leader who ordered hundreds of men, women, and children to commit
mass suicide, was an "agent" of Larry Layton.22 As will be discussed
more fully in Part IV.A, common justifications of the Exception that rely
upon agency theory cannot withstand scrutiny. Instead, the primary
actual justification-that criminal conspiracies are hard to prove and that
the Exception is therefore a necessary compromise between widespread
lawlessness and strict adherence to the Hearsay Rule-makes no sense at
all when applied to a lawful "common enterprise."
Had the court been so inclined, United States v. Layton would have
been a good vehicle for holding that the Exception covers joint action
with an illegal or illicit purpose. It has long been settled that a
"conspiracy" used to justify admission of evidence need not be a crime
for which the defendant was charged; any conspiracy will do."' To the
transmute dictum into decision by waving a wand and uttering the word 'hold."' (quoting United
States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 69 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J., concurring))). But see Barapind v.
Enomoto, 4oo F.3d 744, 750-51 (9th Cir. 2oo5) (en banc) (indicating that dicta is binding in the Ninth
Circuit); cf id. at 758 (Rymer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he discussion about
dicta is dicta.").
226. Frank Bell, who represented Layton at his first trial, at which the jury voted eleven to one in
favor of acquittal, has argued that Layton was convicted at his second trial only because "Robert
Peckham, the very experienced and universally respected federal judge who had also presided over the
first trial, felt compelled by the [Court of Appeals] to allow the introduction of highly inflammatory
evidence which he had barred from the earlier trial." Frank Bell, Larry Layton and Peoples Temple:
Twenty-Five Years Later, ALTERNATIVE CONSIDERAIONS OF JONESTOWN & PEOPLES TEMPLE, Nov. 16,
2oo8, http://jonestown.sdsu.edu/AboutJonestown/PersonalReflections/bell.htm. Layton had been
acquitted by a Guyanese jury, on a "brainwashing" theory, for his own acts of shooting. Id. Lacking
jurisdiction to charge Layton for those acts, the United States charged him under 18 U.S.C. § 351(d),
which prohibits conspiracy to kill members of Congress. Layton, 855 F.2d at 1394.
227. Layton, 855 F.2d at 1399.
228. See id. ("The critical inquiry is simply whether the confederate was acting in his capacity as an
agent of the defendant when he uttered the statements sought to be admitted, i.e., whether the
statements were made 'during the course and in furtherance of' the common enterprise.").
229. See United States v. Martinez, 430 F-3d 357, 326 (6th Cir. 2005) ("[T]he scope of the
conspiracy itself, as alleged in the indictment, does not necessarily limit the application of the co-
conspirator exception." (quoting United States v. Pope, 574 F. 320, 328 (6th Cir. 5978))); id. at 326 nl.4
("In fact, coconspirator statements may be admissible under Rule 8o1(d)(2)(E) even when no
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
extent the Exception makes sense for criminal combinations, it might be
sound to apply it also to lawful but illicit actions, such as adultery.30 The
arguments concerning reliability-that people are unlikely to confess
falsely to criminal activity-would apply to illicit acts. Similarly, if one
views the Exception as a punishment of sort imposed upon those who
combine forces to commit crimes, the justification would apply nearly as
well to noncriminal activity of which society disapproves.23 ' Layton's
cooperation with Jones in planning to hide the truth about Jonestown
from Congressman Ryan, while arguably not in violation of any United
States law, would likely strike most observers as socially detrimental
behavior. It would of course be difficult to decide what counts as "illicit"
under the proposed doctrine, and the Exception would remain on firmer
ground if limited to illegal activity. That said, "legal yet illicit" is a
smaller category than "legal."232 Even the "illegal or illicit" definition of
"conspiracy" for purposes of the Exception would be better than that
sought by prosecutors, who have explicitly advocated the application of
the Exception to completely respectable activity, such as showing up at
the office and putting in a day's work for a day's pay.2 33
A few courts appear to reject the revisionist interpretation. The
Second Circuit, contrary to the language quoted above from United
States v. Russo, has repeatedly suggested (albeit without squarely
holding) that a conspiracy must be "illegal" to satisfy the Exception.234
For example, it observed in United States v. Gigante that "it is the unity
of interests stemming from a specific shared criminal task that justifies
conspiracy has been charged."); United States v. Piper, 298 F.3d 47, 54-55 (Ist Cir. 2002) ("[T]he
rigors of Rule 8o1(d)(2)(E) may be satisfied by showing that both the declarant and the defendant
belonged to some conspiracy other than the substantive conspiracy charged in the indictment . ..
230. Even when legal, adultery has been treated as illicit activity that may have negative legal
consequences. It was not until 1981 that Congress repealed the immigration law provision that
authorized the deportation of aliens who commit adultery, despite many states having earlier
decriminalized adultery. See Morgan v. Attorney Gen., 432 F.3d 226, 232-33 & n.2 (3d Cir. 2005)
(noting 1981 amendment of Immigration and Nationality Act); City of Portland v. Dollarhide, 714
P.2d 220, 227 n.9 (Or. 1986) (noting 197 1 repeal of Oregon law); Succession of Thompson, 367 SO. 2d
796, 799 & n.9 (La. 1979) (listing states that had repealed adultery laws and noting that no such law
existed in Louisiana).
231. The necessity argument would also apply nearly as well to illicit conduct as it does to crimes.
Much antisocial conduct is not fit for criminal punishment on any number of policy grounds-in
addition to constitutional reasons. Nonetheless, society would like to reduce its incidence, and the
application of the Exception to illicit conduct would add one more weapon, however small-bore, to
our policymakers' arsenal.
232. See BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 208, at 763 (defining "illicit" as "[i]llegal or
improper").
233. See Government's Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motions in Limine, supra note 184.
at 13 n.2 (arguing that court should reject older Second Circuit cases that "seem[] to suggest that the
prosecution 'must establish at least the likelihood of an illicit association between the declarant and
the defendant'" (quoting United States v. Garcia-Duarte, 718 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 1983))).
234. See United States v. Stein. No. Si 05 Crim. o888, 2007 WL 3009650, at *5-.6 & on. 34-36
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2007) (collecting cases and declining to decide the question).
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Rule 8o1(d)(2)(E)." 23' In United States v. Ragland, it wrote that "[t]he
threshold requirement for admissibility is satisfied by a showing of a
likelihood of an illicit association between the declarant and the
defendant."'236 In addition, the reporters brim with cases in which courts
use the words "criminal,"237 "unlawful,""' "illegal," 2 39 or "illicit"240 when
describing the sort of joint venture relevant to the Exception. Perhaps
because few lawyers have been bold enough to present the revisionist
interpretation in court, actual holdings rejecting the theory are no easier
to find than cases squarely holding that lawful conduct can satisfy the
Exception 4.2' Although a shortage of cases supporting one's position is
235. 166 F-3d 75, 83 (2d Cir. 1999) ("The district court's rationale would allow the admission of any
statement by any member of the Mafia regarding any criminal behavior of any other member of the
Mafia. This is not to say that there can never be a conspiracy comprising many different Mafia
families; however, it must be a conspiracy with some specific criminal goal in addition to a general
conspiracy to be members of the Mafia.").
236. 375 F.2d 471, 477 (2d Cir. 1967).
237. See, e.g., United States v. Bellomo, 176 F-3d 58o, 586 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Under the rule set out
by Gigante, in order to comply with Fed.R.Evid. 8o1(d)(2)(E) and admit the testimony of a
coconspirator, the district court 'in each instance must find the existence of a specific criminal
conspiracy beyond the general existence of the Mafia."' (quoting Gigante, 166 F.3d at 82)); United
States v. Reynolds, 919 F.2d 435, 439 (7th Cir. 1990) ("[I]t is not necessary to charge a conspiracy in
order to take advantage of Fed.R.Evid. 8o1(d)(2)(E); it is enough to show that a criminal venture
existed and that statements took place during and in furtherance of that scheme.").
238. See, e.g., United States v. Beckham, 968 F.2d 47, S1 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("[T]he independent
evidence here-mere physical proximity and friendship-does not provide support for inferring that
Monroe and Beckham 'had the specific intent to further [a] common unlawful objective."' (second
alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1392 (D.C. Cir. 1988))).
239. See, e.g., United States v. Manfre, 368 F.3d 832, 839 (8th Cir. 2004) ("conspirators' illegal
objectives"); United States v. Garcia, 995 F.2d 556, 561 (5th Cir. 1993) ("Statements regarding the
payment of money for services rendered in accomplishing the illegal goals of a conspiracy can be
considered to be 'in the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy."' (citing United States v. Miller,
664 F.2d 94, 98-99 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. McGuire, 6o8 F.2d 1o28, 1032-33 (5th Cir. 1979))).
240. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Duarte, 718 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 1983) ("[T]he totality of the
independent evidence marshalled by the prosecution must establish at least the 'likelihood of an illicit
association between the declarant and the defendant."' (quoting United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299,
320 (2d Cir. 1983))); United States v. Kiefer, 694 F.2d n1o9, 1112 (8th Cir. 1982) ("Proof of
the. . . existence of a conspiracy, requires a showing of a 'likelihood of illicit association between the
declarant and the defendant." (quoting United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d no9, 1117 (8th Cir. 1977))).
241. The traditionalists are not completely bereft of cases. In State v. Tonelli, 749 N.W.2d 689, 69o-
91 (Iowa 2008), the Supreme Court of Iowa considered the meaning of "conspiracy" under Iowa Rule
of Evidence 5.801(d)(2)(E), which allows the admission of evidence against a party of "a statement by
a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." The Court held that
the Exception "may be applied where there is evidence of a conspiracy to accomplish a criminal or
unlawful act, or to do a lawful act in an unlawful manner, but not to combinations or agreements in
furtherance of entirely lawful goals advanced by lawful means." Id. at 694; see also New York v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 8ii F. Supp. 848, 868-69 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) ("Although the wholesalers and A-B
knowingly entered into an agreement, the State never offered proof showing that the wholesalers and
A-B entered into such agreement with an intent to violate the law, or 'consciously avoided' such
knowledge. Thus, the existence of a conspiracy was never proven, without such a conspiracy, the
statements offered could not be 'in furtherance of a conspiracy.'" (quoting United States v. Beech-Nut
Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d i i8i, 1196 (2d Cir. 1989))).
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hardly great proof of its veracity, here the lack of cases directly
addressing the revisionist interpretation-whether adopting it or
rejecting it-supports the belief that the revisionist theory represents a
change from the traditional common-law Exception. When one considers
the immense number of "lawful combinations" and innocent "joint
ventures" in which citizens participate every day, it seems highly
improbable that (i) there exists a rule of evidence allowing any
statement made in furtherance of such a licit venture to be admitted at
the trial, civil or criminal, of any other fellow participant; yet (2) this rule,
despite its immense potential utility both to prosecutors and to civil
litigators, has not been clearly stated in actual court holdings. The
Exception applies in civil as well as criminal cases.242 If, as prosecutors
argued just a few years ago to the D.C. Circuit, the "Court has squarely
held [in 1983] that co-conspirator statements made during and in
furtherance of a lawful common plan are admissible under Rule
80 (d)(2)(E),"243 one would expect to see reports of civil litigators
invoking the Exception to avoid the Hearsay Rule, gambits which would
lead courts to decide the question one way or another.2 " One would also
expect to see evidence treatises citing these cases and announcing the
majority rule.245 Instead, one finds uncertain statements suggesting that
legal objectives may count as "conspiracies" in a few circuits, supported
mostly by dicta from cases concerning conspiracies of an obviously
criminal nature.246
242. See Earle v. Benoit, 85o F.2d 836, 841 n.6 (ist Cir. 1988) ("Although most of the cases
discussing the co-conspirator evidentiary exception are criminal, the exception is equally applicable in
civil cases."); New York v. Hendrickson Bros., 84o F.2d io65, 1073-74 (2d Cir. 1988) (upholding
admission of testimony pursuant to Rule 8o1(d)(2)(E) in civil antitrust suit).
243. Final Brief of the United States at 39, United States v. Gewin, 471 F.3d 197 (D.C. Cir. Apr.
27, 2oo6) (No. 05-3086).
244. Such efforts would be expected not only in federal courts. Many, if not all, of the states have a
rule of evidence similar to Federal Rule of Evidence 8oi(d)(2)(E). See, e.g., CAL. EvIw. CODE § 1223
(West 1995); MINN. R. EVID. § 8oI(d)(2)(E) (2oo6).
245. Demonstrating that the revisionist position is indeed novel, at least one professor of law has
been travelling the country advising civil litigators to apply the Exception to lawful ventures. See
E-mail from Professor David Sonenshein, Temple Univ. Sch. of Law, to Author (Mar. 5. 2009, o8:51
am EST) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal) ("Although I may doubt the wisdom of courts'
extending the co-conspirator admission rule to joint ventures with a legal purpose, I make both law
students and practicing lawyers aware of the fact that a number of federal circuits have indicated their
willingness to affirm the admission of co-conspirator statements where the object of the combination
or joint venture is neither criminal nor in violation of the civil law.").
246. See, e.g., MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 801:25, at 857 n.3 (6th ed.
2oo6) (citing one case): EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE §IIIO, at 72 n.5
(4th ed. 2005 & supp. 2008) (citing three cases); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK,
FEDERAL EVIDENCE §8:59, at 478 nl.4 (2008) (citing three cases); 5 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE §801.34, at n.5.i.i (2d ed. 2002) (citing five cases, most
containing only dicta on the question).
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IL. THE SURVEY: REPORTED FEDERAL CASES SINCE 1975
The revisionist theory depends upon a key premise: that it is not
truly revisionist at all. Instead, the revisionists argue that their view of
the Exception, which holds that a "conspiracy" need be neither illegal
nor illicit to qualify, has been around for years.247 They bolster this
position by citing old cases.248 As shown above, however, many cases
seemingly supporting the revisionist position cannot be said to hold that
lawful ventures satisfy the Exception because the cases concern illegal
schemes. 49 To test the revisionist theory, I-along with indefatigable
research assistants -reviewed around 2500 cases from eight federal
circuits.' By searching Westlaw for district and circuit court cases
containing either a reference to Rule 8ol(d)(2)(E) or words indicating
use of the Exception,'5' the survey likely found the overwhelming
majority of cases discussing the Exception since the codification of the
Federal Rules.' 5 ' The survey covers the Courts of Appeals for the First,
Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and District of Columbia
Circuits, as well as all district courts under their supervision.'" Both
reported and unreported cases were included.
A. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
For each circuit, the search string yielded tens or hundreds of cases.
Each case was then reviewed, and whenever the opinion indicated the
247. See, e.g., supra notes 182-87, 243 and accompanying text.
248. E.g., Government's Memorandum in Support of Its Motions in Limine, supra note 184, at 12-
13 (citing, among others, cases from 1979, 1984, and 1986).
249. See supra Part II.B.
250. Thanks are due to the attorneys and legal assistants at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
LLP, who compiled a similar chart covering the Third Circuit that served as a partial inspiration for
this Article. According to the brief to which the chart was attached as an appendix, "Of the one-
hundred forty nine opinions [Skadden was] able to locate, not one permitted the introduction of
statements where the conspiracy, or to use the government's term-'joint venture'-had a benign
purpose .... ".Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Frederick S. Schiff's Response to the
Government's Motion in Limine to Admit Statements of Co-Conspirators Pursuant to Federal Rule of
Evidence 8o1(d)(2)(E) at 5, United States v. Schiff, 538 F. Supp. 2d 818 (D.N.J. Feb. x9, 2oo8) (Crim.
No. o6-4o6).
251. The searches were conducted between May and December 2008. For each circuit studied, the
search string was ["8o1(d)(2)(e)" (hearsay /io (co-conspir! conspir!)) (8oi(d)! /io conspir!)]. The
search string also included an entry to exclude Supreme Court cases, which otherwise would have been
returned for every circuit. See Ben Trachtenberg, Circuit Master Chart (Mar. 4, 2009) (unpublished
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, on file with the Hastings Law Journal). The Circuit Master Chart
incorporates the results of all the circuits surveyed.
252. Because of the search terms used, as well as Westlaw's more limited scope for older cases,
only a small minority of the cases reviewed predate the enactment of the Federal Rules in 19y75.
253. The choice of circuits was largely arbitrary. Care was taken to include a few of the circuits
from which dicta support the revisionist position, such as the Fifth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit. Once
the pattern of results became apparent, it was deemed unnecessary to complete an exhaustive survey
of all circuits.
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admission of evidence pursuant to the Exception, the case was recorded
on that Circuit's chart. For each case, the chart records the object of the
conspiracy in furtherance of which the admitted statements were made.
The chart also indicates whether the case was criminal or civil. Finally,
the chart records whether the object of the conspiracy was (i) illegal; (2)
legal, but illicit; or (3) legal and licit.
The results are stark: Of 2516 cases recorded, 99 were civil cases and
2417 were criminal. Of the 2516 opinions for which the object of a
conspiracy was recorded, all but four concerned an illegal object.' Three
of the four outliers concerned the same criminal case, which yielded
multiple opinions discussing the issue. 55 The other outlier is a civil case in
which the trial judge noted that he was bound to follow Gewin., 6 For the
remainder, the conspiratorial aims ran the gamut of crime and vice,
including auto theft, bribery, counterfeiting, drug trafficking, extortion,
false statements, gambling, health care fraud, and so on through the
alphabet of illegality. Some of the more obscure illegal aims included
importing illegal swordfish5 7 and communicating with the East German
Secret Service in violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
Other than in two cases described below, none of the "conspiracies"
included ordinary lawful activity such as "making money for a common
employer," "taking a recreational boat trip," or "seeking grant money to
support the justice system of an Indian tribe in Mississippi." 259
The first outlier case is United States v. Anderson, in which the court
found that a group of declarants "all were participants of a common plan
to put together and facilitate and operate and carry out the relationship
of Baptist Medical Center and Blue Valley Medical Group for the
continuum of care. They participated in a joint venture, if you will, for
254. See Trachtenberg, supra note 251.
255. Infra note 260.
256. See Miller v. Holzmann, 563 F. Supp. 2d 54, 86 n.29 (D.D.C. 2oo8); see also infra Part V.D
(discussing Miller in greater detail).
257. See United States v. Cranston, 686 F.2d 56, 57 (ist Cir. 1982).
258. See Kauffman v. Sec'y of the Air Force, 415 F.2d 991, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
259. These examples are not hypothetical. Cf Memorandum in Support of the Motion in Limine
of the United States to Admit Statements of Co-Conspirators Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence
8oi(d)(2)(E) at 7, United States v. Schiff, 538 F. Supp. 2d 818 (D.N.J. Feb. 12, 2oo8) (Crim. No. o6-
406) (common employer, seeking admission of statements, by coworkers of defendants whom the
government did not accuse of wrongful conduct, concerning lawful activities by pharmaceutical
company to sell products); supra text accompanying note i (quoting reply brief in same case). For the
boat trip, see United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862. 867, 886 n-41 (5th Cir. 1979), stating in dicta
notwithstanding that sailors had been caught with about 8ooo pounds of marijuana, "the voyage was a
'joint venture' in and of itself apart from the illegality of its purpose," meaning that the sailors'
"logbook was therefore admissible as nonhearsay". For the grant money, see Government's
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike Exhibits and Exclude Witnesses at 9-To, United States v.
Ring, No. 1:o8-CR-274 (D.D.C. Sept. 7, 2009), characterizing as coconspirator hearsay an e-mail
message stating, of a Department of Justice grant application. "[M]aybe we could come [up] with some
strategy in order to make sure [the Choctaw] get the rest of the money." (alterations in original).
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the purposes of 801(d)(2)(E).',26o Unfortunately for purposes of the
survey, the trial judge did not make findings concerning the legality of
each declarant's activity, concluding instead that no such finding was
required by the Exception:
The rule is rooted in agency principles, as are its siblings, Rules
8oi(d)(2)(C) and 8oi(d)(2)(D). The court rejects the overly cynical
view that 8o1(d)(2)(E)'s relaxation of hearsay standards is really based
on a perceived need to convict criminal conspirators, and, thus, the
alleged joint undertaking must have a criminal purpose. The Federal
Rules of Evidence do not relax out of expediency other evidentiary
standards, merely upon a finding by the court by a preponderance of
the evidence that the party or parties against whom the evidence is
offered are criminal conspirators.
As discussed in Part IV below, the "agency principles" justification
for the Exception has a weak theoretical basis,262 and the "need to convict
criminal conspirators"-cynical though it may be-seems indeed to be
the primary justification for the Exception's existence. Regardless, at
least some of the declarants at issue were convicted of "one or more
substantive violations of the Medicare Anti-Kickback Act,"263 suggesting
that the "joint venture" of carrying out a relationship between Baptist
and Blue Valley may have violated the law.264 With respect to other
declarants, however, who served in good faith as attorneys for the
defendants, the court found that "there was no evidence that. . . they
were involved in criminal activity."265 Accordingly, Anderson is a true
example of a court admitting evidence pursuant to the revisionist
interpretation of the Exception. The only other such case found by the
survey, Miller v. Holzmann,266 is discussed in Part V.D below.
In all the other cases reviewed in which evidence was admitted
pursuant to the Exception, the "conspiracy" justifying the invocation of
Rule 8o1(d)(2)(E) had an unlawful object. This includes not only the
260. United States v. Anderson, 85 F. Supp. 2d 1o47, 1o79 (D. Kan. 1999). The survey also
reviewed another opinion related to this case, United States v. LaHue, 261 F.3d 993, 1oo9 (loth Cir.
2001), which declined to address the question after finding that "even if the district court erroneously
admitted the disputed documents, we hold their admission constituted harmless error." A third related
opinion is reported at United States v. McClatchey, 217 F.3d 823, 835 (ioth Cir. 2000), which found that
defendant waived objections related to the Exception because his brief "fails to identify the specific
statements which he now contends were wrongly admitted."
261. Anderson, 85 F. Supp. 2d at xo79.
262. This is admitted in the Advisory Committee note to Rule 8ox(d)(2)(E). See supra notes 133-
42 and accompanying text.
263. Anderson, 85 F. Supp. 2d at 1o52.
264. If not all declarants could be found to have committed illegal conduct, perhaps their roles in
the referral scheme were illicit. But see infra note 265-.
265. United States v. Anderson, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1163, I168-70 (D. Kan. 1999) (finding that
prosecution violated declarants' due process rights by identifying them in publicly-filed pretrial papers
as "unindicted coconspirators").
266. 563 F. Supp. 2d 54 (D.D.C. 2008).
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criminal cases but also the civil cases at which coconspirator statements
were presented. The joint action allowing the admission of statements in
civil cases included antitrust law violations, conspiracies to violate civil
rights, securities fraud, and insurance fraud.2' In certain of the cases, the
conspiracy involved conduct that could have been charged criminally. In
others, it constituted a civil wrong only. 68
B. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
The survey results resoundingly prove that, at least in practice,
courts and practitioners do not apply the Exception to joint ventures
with lawful aims. Discovering the state of the law is not the same as
illustrating what it should be, and the survey results cannot in themselves
answer whether the Exception ought to cover legal combinations. They
do, however, refute the revisionists' ongoing argument that their position
is old hat, nothing new, and no cause for debate on whether courts
should adopt a new interpretation of a rule of evidence codified in 1975
and understood largely in its current form since around the founding of
the United States. The survey almost certainly missed some cases
applying the Exception to admit evidence, but even if a surprisin
number of the overlooked cases concerned completely lawful conduct,2
the results of the survey would remain materially the same. In cases
applying the Exception to admit evidence of coconspirator statements,
nearly every single one out of thousands-the overwhelming majority-
concern conspiracies with unlawful objectives. Accordingly, the
argument made by prosecutors over the past several years-and on a few
occasions before then-would, if accepted, cause a material change to
Federal Rule of Evidence 8oI(d)(2)(E). The change would have the
effect of expanding the Exception, allowing statements previously
excluded as hearsay to be admitted at civil and criminal trials.
IV. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE EXCEPTION AND THEIR RELATION TO
LAWFUL "CONSPIRACIES"
In considering whether the change sought by the revisionists should
be adopted, a review of the practical and theoretical support for the
267. Battle v. Lubrizol Corp., 673 F.2d 984, 990-9i (8th Cir. 1982) (antitrust); Zaken v. Boerer, 964
F.2d 1319, 1324 (2d Cir. 1992) (civil rights); Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Tex. Commerce Bank. 630 F.2d
I I1, I 120-21 (5th Cir. 1980) (securities fraud); United States v. Gravatt. 83 F.3d 434 (xoth Cir. 1996)
(insurance fraud). The exception is Miller.
268. See Gray v. Sage Telecom, Inc., No. 3:05-CV-1677-G, 2oo6 WL 2820075, at *5 n.8, *I7 (N.D.
Tex. Oct. 2, 2oo6) (civil claims concerning retaliation in violation of Title VII and conspiracy to ask
questions prohibited by Texas labor law); Delta Educ., Inc. v. Langlois, 719 F. Supp. 42, 46-47 (D.N.H.
1989) (civil complaint alleging criminal fraud).
269. The existence of an independent survey of the Third Circuit, which found zero such cases,
makes such a result unlikely. See supra note 250.
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Exception is useful. This Part reviews the primary justifications
presented for the existence of the Exception, and it then considers how
each fares when used to justify an expansion of the Exception to include
lawful combinations. The leading arguments put forth to support the
Exception are (i) an analogy to agency law and the principal-agent
exception to the Rule, wherein each conspirator is said to adopt his
confederates as his agents; (2) the proposition that statements within the
Exception are not hearsay at all because they constitute verbal acts; (3)
the argument that, like other categories of hearsay for which exceptions
exist, coconspirator statements are generally reliable and so ought not be
barred by the Rule; and (4) the practical position that absent the
Exception, necessary prosecutions of many crimes-ranging from
treason to drug distribution-would be impossible, or at least severely
impeded.270 Of these, only the practical argument from necessity survives
serious scrutiny. Because the primary justification is practical rather than
principled, the revisionist attempts to expand the scope of the Exception
merit particular suspicion, lest zealous efforts to convict more offenders
allow more inherently unreliable evidence into criminal trials without the
safeguard of cross-examination.
A. ANALOGY To AGENCY THEORY
Perhaps the most popular justification for the Exception is an
analogy to the law of agency and to the principal-agent exception to the
Rule. In Van Riper v. United States, Learned Hand wrote that
coconspirator
declarations are admitted upon no doctrine of the law of evidence but
of the substantive law of the crime. When men enter into an agreement
for an unlawful end, they become ad hoc agents for one another, and
have made "a partnership in crime." What one does pursuant to their
common purpose, all do, and, as declarations may be such acts, they
are competent against all.27'
The theory is simple enough to state: Because each member of a
conspiracy has willingly joined the criminal combination, each becomes
the agent of all the others. When one recalls that the "overt act" of a
single conspirator can secure the conviction for conspiracy of others who
merely agree to commit crime272 -and that one member of a conspiracy
may be punished for the substantive crimes of another 273-the idea that
270. See David S. Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-Conspirator Exception in
Criminal Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 HARV. L. REV. '378, 1384 (r972) ("[T]he major
development of the exception has been the result of a seemingly random appeal to [these]
rationales. .. )
271. 13 F.2d 96!, 967 (2d Cir. 1926).
272. Bravennan v. United States, 3r7 U.S. 49, 53 (1942).
273. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 64o, 647 (1946).
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one conspirator's statements may be used against another has an
intuitive appeal.
It turns out, however, that this explanation is very weak, as the
drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence acknowledged." As a
preliminary matter, the Exception does not include the limitations and
protections that govern the admission into evidence of hearsay
statements by agents. In addition to the limitations already discussed,"
the principal-agent exception excludes statements made by the agent
before the start of the principal-agent relationship.7 A conspirator, on
the other hand, is deemed to have "ratified" the statements made by his
confederates before he joined an existing criminal scheme." In addition,
because the cases construing the Exception differ from those announcing
the substantive law of conspiracy, "neither collateral estoppel nor res
judicata automatically bars the use of statements by a person who has
been acquitted of the crime of conspiracy.78
More importantly, the analogy of the relationship among two
coconspirators to that of a principal and her agent fails even as a
theoretical matter. As one observer put it, "[t]he practical considerations
which justify forcing a principal to adopt, for business and evidence
purposes, the statements of his authorized agent are not present with a
conspiracy, because its members often lack the power to control or
authorize other members' actions."279 The principal-agent exception
makes sense in light of the underlying purpose of agency law, which
allows persons dealing with agents to have confidence that the agents'
principals will not later avoid making good on the agents' promises.
Principals have a strong incentive to monitor the statements of their
servants and agents, and they can do so because of their employment or
agency relationships." It is hard to understand, however, what analogous
social good is advanced through the use of one coconspirator's
274. See FED. R. EVID. 8oI(d)(2)(E) advisory committee's note ("[T]he agency theory of
conspiracy is at best a fiction . . . .").
275. See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
276. See SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 43 n-3 (2d Cir. 1976) (excluding deposition by
employee offered against employer because employee was on suspension when deposed).
277. See United States v. Baines, 812 F.2d 41, 42 (ist Cir. 1987) ("[A] conspiracy is like a train.
When a party knowingly steps aboard, he is part of the crew, and assumes conspirator's responsibility
for the existing freight . . . ."); United States v. Badalamenti, 794 F.2d 821, 826-28 (2d Cir. 1986)
(holding that "statements of Badalamenti's co-conspirators are admissible against him, even if made
before he joined the conspiracy" and rejecting defendant's argument that limitations applicable to
principal-agent exception should apply).
278. United States v. Gil, 604 F.2d 546, 549 (7th Cir. 1979). The Gil Court was generous enough to
concede that "an acquittal might be relevant and persuasive in the determination of whether the
Government has demonstrated the requisite criminal joint venture." Id.
279. James W. Jennings, Preserving the Right to Confrontation -A New Approach to Hearsay
Evidence in Criminal Trials, 1i3 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 755 (1965) (footnote omitted).
280. Similar theories undergird the rule of respondeat superior in tort law.
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statements against another."' It is not as though the law wishes to ensure
that one coconspirator will make good on the (presumably unlawful)
promises of another. Does the law say to would-be criminals, "Make sure
not to choose confederates who will talk too much"'?"' Indeed,
considering that a conspirator is on the hook for statements made before
his arrival, perhaps the law instructs a would-be criminal, "Make sure not
to choose confederates who have talked too much."
The agency analogy is a jumble, and courts' continuing reliance on it
suggests strongly that the Exception survives for practical reasons rather
than because it fits neatly into a unified theory of evidence law.
B. ANALOGY TO VERBAL ACTS OR "RES GESTAE"
Another justification of dubious credibility is that statements
admitted under the Exception are not hearsay at all, and accordingly
should be accepted without objection from hearsay purists, because they
constitute verbal acts."' If they are acts instead of statements, then they
cannot be hearsay, which is defined as a class of statements.284 The
primary problem with this explanation is that no one really believes it.
After all, if a piece of evidence proffered for admission at trial is not a
"statement," and accordingly cannot be "hearsay," the proponent need
not resort to any "hearsay exception." Such exceptions allow the
admission of evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible hearsay.
When a prosecutor offers into evidence at a murder trial the 911 call of
the victim identifying the defendant as the killer, a defense objection
based on the Hearsay Rule would yield a prosecutorial reference to the
appropriate hearsay exception.'' If the prosecutor then offers into
evidence the baseball bat used to kill the victim, a defense objection
based on the Hearsay Rule would yield a confused look from the
prosecutor and judge.
The belief that statements admitted under the Exception are not
actually statements may result from the somewhat odd, and almost
281. Other than increasing the ease of prosecution, discussed infra Part IV.D.
282. If anything, such an incentive might make it more difficult to detect and prosecute criminal
conspiracies because participants will act with knowledge that "loose lips sink ships."
283. For example, when a defendant accused of illegal whiskey distillation objected to the
admission of a coconspirator's statement "telling the [government] witness Brown that he needed fruit
jars at the still," the Fourth Circuit admitted the statement. See United States v. Copeland, 295 F.2d
635, 637 (4th Cir. 1961). "The imparting of this information was in furtherance of the plan or
scheme .. .. This being true, the declarations ..,. of all of the conspirators are a part of the res gestae
and, therefore, admissible." Id.; see also Myers v. United States, 377 F.2d 412, 419-20 (4th Cir. 1967)-
The phrase "res gestae" is Latin for the "things done" or "thing transacted." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY,
supra note 208, at 1335.
284. See FED. R. EVID. 8oI (c) ("'Hearsay' is a statement. .. )
285. See id. R. 804(b)(2); supra text accompanying note 77.
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certainly accidental, creation of the Exception as a black-letter rule.
Many of the iconic English cases in which coconspirator statements were
admitted-cases that American jurists and scholars subsequently cited as
support for what they concluded was a rule allowing for the admission of
such statements generally-involved statements that easily could have
been admitted without any special hearsay exception."" A conspirator's
letter informing England's enemies of convenient places for an armed
288invasion is itself an act of treason; it is no mere statement.
Contrast the treasonous letter with a common application of the
Exception today, in which statements by a drug seller to an undercover
agent are admitted against a coconspirator of the seller. Imagine that at
the trial of Washington for selling illegal drugs, the government calls to
the stand Agent Jefferson, who testifies that while undercover, he
purchased drugs from a dealer named Adams. Under the Exception,
Jefferson could freely testify that after he asked Adams why he should
buy the drugs in question, Adams replied, "Because George Washington
only sells the best stuff." Adams's out-of-court statement would come in
against Washington regardless of whether Adams could be cross-
examined. Unlike the treasonous letter, Adams's statement is just that, a
mere statement. Unlike inviting a foreign army to invade, it is no crime
to state that George Washington sells only the best stuff;" the crime
Adams committed was selling drugs.
Another reason statements composing criminal acts are not hearsay
is that they are not admitted for the truth of what they assert. If the
invitation to invade reads, "Attack New Jersey tonight, for the defenses
are weak," the writer has committed treason even if the defenses are
strong. If anything, the analogy to verbal acts and res gestae undermines
286. See supra Part I.B.
287. See supra Part I.B.
288. See, e.g., Trial of William Stone, 25 How. St. Tr. Ii55, 1288 (1796) (accepting as evidence of
high treason a conspirator's letter stating that "in Ireland, a conquered, oppressed, and insulted
country the name of England, and her power is universally odious,... [and] the great bulk of the
people would be ready to throw off the yoke in this country, if they saw any force sufficiently strong to
resort to for defence," making Ireland "directly favourable to invasion"); see also Mueller, supra note
84, at 328 & n.15.
289. E.g., United States v. Mooneyham, 473 F.3d 280, 285-86 (6th Cir. 2007) ("McMahan was
indisputably Mooneyham's co-conspirator, and the statement in question was clearly made in
furtherance of the conspiracy because it was directed at a potentially recurring customer (Agent
Williams) with the intention of reassuring him of Mooneyham's reliability as a supplier."); United
States v. Piper, 298 F-3d 47, 53 (ist Cir. 2002); United States v. Romo, 914 F.2d 889, 896 (7th Cir. 1990)
(upholding admission, at trial of Ann, of testimony concerning "statement of Juanita to an undercover
police officer that Juanita was going to Ann's house to pick up cocaine"); see also United States v.
Henderson, 307 F. App'x 970, 977 (6th Cir. 2009) ("Statements have been found to be in furtherance
of a conspiracy where they . . . indicate 'the source or purchaser of controlled substances.'" (quoting
United States v. Hitow, 889 F.2d i573, x58i (6th Cir. 1989))).
290. One could imagine an undercover officer testifying to the same facts, should he learn through
his work that Washington enjoys such a reputation.
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the case for the Exception because, even without the Exception,
statements constituting criminal acts are admissible. Accordingly, the
statements that seem to best justify the Exception do not need it,
meaning that the Exception's existence serves in practice to admit only
the least justifiable coconspirator statements. 2 91
C. RELIABILITY
In a justification that does not require elaborate analogy or appeals
to the theory of substantive conspiracy law, some argue that
coconspirator statements should be admitted for the same reason that
many other statements come in under a hearsay exception: reliability. 292
Because sensible people do not falsely accuse themselves of criminal
acts, the argument goes, one can expect the statements of conspirators to
be true. In practice, the reliability of statements admitted under the
Exception is much disputed.293 Any such statement must be viewed with
at least some suspicion because, by definition, it was uttered by a
291. The use of the Exception only for the worst statements is especially problematic when one
considers that at least some coconspirator statements (albeit by no means all of them) could be
properly admitted under the principal-agent exception, and these would tend to be among the
coconspirator statements most worthy of admission. See, e.g., Re/Max Int'l, Inc. v. Realty One, Inc.,
173 F.3d 995, 1010-12 (6th Cir. 1999). If a loan shark's enforcer punches a victim in the face while
saying, "My boss, Smith, is tired of waiting for your money," the statement likely could be admitted
against Smith under Rule 8or(d)(2)(D). See United States v. Martel, 792 F.2d 630, 635 (7th Cir. 1986);
see also The Simpsons: The Twisted World of Marge Simpson (Fox television broadcast Jan. 19, 1997)
(Fat Tony to Homer: "You see, my wife, she has been most vocal on the subject of the pretzel
monies."); supra note 113 (discussing civil agency relationship among conspirators in Gooding).
292. See Note, Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule, 75 YALE L.J. 1434, 1437 (1966). As the note
author observed,
Inevitably, any hearsay rule is arbitrary. The judge cannot halt the trial to ponder the
reliability of every item of hearsay evidence; nor can attorneys calculate reliability in time to
object to hearsay in a running narrative. They must have broad categories of admissibility
which yield an effortless decision. In this area, rules of law must be rules of thumb. All we
can ask is that the categories of admissible hearsay be generally reliable; any particular
example may be suspect and call for the exercise by a trial judge of his discretion to exclude
unreliable evidence.
Id.
293. Compare, e.g., United States v. Morrow, 39 F.3d 1228, 1235 (ist Cir. 1994) ("Arguably, the co-
conspirator hearsay exception is an historical anomaly, there being nothing especially reliable about
such statements...."), and Park v. Huff, 5o6 F.2d 849, 863 (5th Cir. 1975) (Wisdom, J., dissenting)
("The reliability of a co-conspirator's out-of-court statement is shaky at best."), with 4 WIGMORE, supra
note 5, § 1077 ("[A]s a matter of probative value, the admissions of a person having precisely the same
interests at stake will in general be likely to be equally worthy of consideration."). The Supreme Court
seems to have sided with Wigmore on the reliability question, declaring that coconspirator statements
belong to a class of hearsay exceptions whose reliability need not be examined. See Bourjaily v. United
States, 483 U.S. 171, 182-83 (1987) ("We think that the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule is
firmly enough rooted in our jurisprudence that .. . a court need not independently inquire into the
reliability of such statements."); see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004) (stating that
"statements in furtherance of a conspiracy" are "not testimonial").
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criminal.294 Further, the secretive nature of a criminal conspiracy can
create situations in which the extrajudicial declarant whose statement is
admitted at trial had no personal knowledge of the defendant or her
activities.295
Let us return to Adams, the drug pusher. When speaking with
Agent Jefferson, whom Adams believes to be a bona fide prospective
customer, Adams must decide how to convince Jefferson to buy. He
states that "George Washington only sells the best stuff." One could
ascribe many motives to Adams in making this statement. Perhaps
Washington truly is Adams's supplier and is known for selling top-quality
drugs; information about the provenance of the drugs might help close a
sale. Then again, perhaps Washington is known for selling top-quality
drugs, but Adams buys schwag from Burr and attempts to pass it off as
Washington-quality stuff. Or perhaps Adams has obtained good stuff on
his own and now seeks to enter Washington's good graces by associating
Washington's name with such a fine product. We just don't know. What
we do know is that if Adams's statement comes into evidence through
Jefferson's testimony, Washington's prospects for acquittal look a lot
worse.
This simple example, which relies on a fact pattern all too common
in American courts, illustrates the problem with assuming that criminals
tell the truth, especially when they speak about other people. Joseph
Levie described the problem well fifty years ago: "Of course sane men do
not falsely admit to conspiracy. Conspirators' declarations are good to
prove that some conspiracy exists but less trustworthy to show its aims
and membership."9 6 In this case, Adams would indeed be reckless to go
about town claiming to be a drug dealer were he not actually selling
drugs. The analogy to statements against interest is sound as far as it
goes. This Article has already presented, however, multiple reasons that
Adams might lie about Washington, and the specific facts of actual cases
applying the Exception provide countless more motives for criminals to
lie about one another s actions.
One might wish to ignore the questionable reliability of
coconspirator statements if they were admitted only against criminal
conspirators. Society visits much worse punishment upon criminal
conspirators, with long prison terms being but one example. One could
therefore describe the admission of coconspirator statements against a
person as an additional cost of crime. The difficulty arises upon the
294. See Levie, supra note 132, at 1166 ("It is no victory for common sense to make a belief that
criminals are notorious for their veracity the basis for law.").
295. See S. Douglas Borisky, Note, Reconciling the Conflict Between the Coconspirator Exemption
from the Hearsay Rule and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, 85 CoLU M. L. REV. I1294,
1307-09 (1985).
296. Levie, supra note 132. at ix65.
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realization that while a prosecutor must prove a defendant's guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt before sending him to prison, a proponent of
statements under the Exception need prove their admissibility only by a
preponderance of the evidence, and the unreliable statement itself can
help the prosecutor meet her burden. 97 As David Davenport observes,
"It is one thing to say that because we hate all conspirators, we will treat
conspirators especially harshly. But it is quite another to say that because
we hate conspirators, we will treat harshly everyone accused of
conspiracy."298
D. NECESSITY
When all else fails, proponents of the Exception appeal to necessity,
arguing that absent the Exception certain important criminal
prosecutions would be impossible. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit provides a candid acknowledgement of the Exception's
weak theoretical basis in United States v. Goldberg:
Frankly, the underlying co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule
makes little sense as a matter of evidence policy. No special guarantee
of reliability attends such statements, save to the extent that they
resemble declarations against interest. The exception derives from
agency law, an analogy that is useful in some contexts but (as the
Advisory Committee noted) is "at best a fiction" here. The most that
can be said is that the co-conspirator exception to hearsay is of long
standing and makes a difficult-to-detect crime easier to prove.299
Justice Blackmun, dissenting from the Court's opinion in Bourjaily
abolishing the prohibition on "bootstrapping,"" pointed out that the
Exception already allows for the admission of often-unreliable evidence:
"The co-conspirator 'admission' exception was also justified on the
ground that the need for this evidence, which was particularly valuable in
prosecuting a conspiracy, permitted a somewhat reduced concern for the
reliability of the statement."'o Indeed, Justice Powell's majority opinion
in Inadi makes much of how "irreplaceable" coconspirator statements
are 'as substantive evidence." 302
The appeal to necessity should not surprise anyone familiar with the
substantive crime of conspiracy. Clandestine criminal combinations are
297. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 701 (1974); supra note 163 and accompanying text.
298. See Davenport, supra note 270, at 1391.
299. United States v. Goldberg, 105 F.3d 770, 775 (ist Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Gil, 604
F.2d 546, 549 (7th Cir.- 979) ("It has also been candidly proposed by commentators, and implicitly
acknowledged by the Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Evidence, that the exception is
largely a result of necessity, since it is most often invoked in conspiracy cases in which the proof would
otherwise be very difficult and the evidence largely circumstantial.").
300. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
301. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 190 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
302. 475 U.S. 387, 395-96 (1986).
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difficult to prove, and nearly impossible to prove absent testimony-
obtained one way or another-from participants. At the 1696 trial of
Robert Charnock and others for high treason, Lord Chief Justice Holt
addressed a defense objection that defendants' conspirators "cannot be
good witnesses" because they "are involved in the same crime."" After
instructing the jurors that the weight of such evidence was a matter for
their discretion, Lord Holt then provided a spirited defense of its
admission:
[Y]ou may consider that traitorous conspiracies are deeds of darkness
as well as wickedness, the discovery whereof can properly come only
from the conspirators themselves; such evidence has always been
allowed as good proof in all ages; and they are the most proper
witnesses, for otherwise it is hardly possible, if not altogether
impossible, to have a full proof of such secret contrivances; such
discoveries are to be encouraged in all governments, without which
there can be no safety.304
In the end, necessity stands alone in believably supporting the
Exception. Judges from Lord Holt to the Bourjaily majority have
recognized the importance of the statements of a defendant's
confederates to the prosecution of a conspirator. This conclusion does
not undermine the Exception completely; the rules of evidence are
nothing if not a stab at balancing fairness and practicality. It should,
however, encourage great caution whenever someone suggests
expanding the Exception, a procedural change that would inevitably
cause the admission of additional false statements not subject to cross-
examination.
E. APPLICATION OF THE JUSTIFICATIONS To LAWFUL "CONSPIRACIES"
Acknowledging the true justification for the Exception requires that
one reject the revisionist interpretation. The expansion of the principal-
agent doctrine to criminal conspiracies depends on a belief that criminals
become one another s agents when joining an illegal scheme. Although
tenuous as a matter of theory, it can be argued that suffering such a rule
is a risk that criminals assume when they form illegal combinations. Not
so, however, for lawful ventures. When someone becomes a corporate
employee, few would agree that every statement made in support of the
corporation's profit-making objectives by any fellow employee, whether
known or unknown to him, should be admissible at totally unrelated
trials without cross-examination. While the shadowy nature of criminal
gangs may allow the legal fiction that every member is the agent of all
others, no respected theory of agency law holds that every employee of a
corporation is the agent of all fellow servants.
303. Trial of Robert Charnock. x2 How. St. Tr. '377. 1454 (1696).
304. Id.
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The verbal acts justification fares even worse when applied to lawful
cooperation, for it makes sense only as an analogy to the substantive law
of crime. Whereas a treasonous statement is both a communication and a
verbal act (or "res gestae"), and so may be properly deemed "not
hearsay" because of its dual nature as speech and actus reus, no such
duality applies to statements made to further the aims of everyday lawful
organizations."o0 Similarly, the argument that coconspirator statements
should be admissible because of their inherent reliability has no
credibility when applied to legal behavior. If the theory is that only a fool
would falsely implicate himself in crime, the theory cannot support an
extension to statements that "implicate" their speakers in totally
respectable behavior.
A simple example shows how unjustifiable the Exception appears
when applied to lawful conduct. Imagine that Langdell, a law review
articles editor, is on trial for a murder in New York. His alibi is that he
was at lunch with Holmes, the editor-in-chief, at the time of the
murder-in Boston, no less. As it happens, for suspicious but unknown
reasons, Holmes cannot be found to testify at trial. On the day of the
murder, however, Holmes said by telephone to another articles editor,
Pound, "I can't be at the articles committee meeting today because I'm
waiting for the cable guy all day at my apartment in Brooklyn." The
statement is hearsay, so Pound cannot repeat it at trial to undercut the
alibi. Holmes is an out-of-court declarant, and the prosecution would
offer his words to prove the truth of the matter asserted: that Holmes
was in Brooklyn on the day of the murder, not lunching in Boston as
Langdell had claimed. Were Pound to testify about Holmes's statement,
Langdell would be unable to cross-examine the declarant about the
statement, preventing him from effectively attacking Holmes's
credibility. It could be, for example, that Holmes indeed said what Pound
remembers but was simply lying, perhaps because he needed an excuse
for skipping the committee meeting. Or perhaps the cable guy came early
(implausible as that scenario might seem), allowing Holmes to catch a
Boston train arriving in time for a late lunch with Langdell. Without
producing Holmes and exposing him to questioning by the defense, the
prosecution cannot use his statement, which is the basest hearsay,
regardless of how reliable and honest Pound may be.36
305. If the revisionists are correct, statements that are admissible under the Exception as "not
hearsay" would include ( ) any statement by one employee to a fellow servant "in furtherance" of
their employer's business objectives, which might include a call to one's boss explaining why the caller
will be late for work; (2) a statement by one recreational sailor to another about their common boat
trip; and (3) statements among members of a nonprofit organization, such as a charity or a law journal,
about their work. Potential examples are as varied as lawful human activity.
306. Cf Crawford v. washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) ("Raleigh was, after all, perfectly free to
confront those who read Cobham's confession in court.").
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But if a statement in furtherance of lawful joint action satisfies the
Exception, Langdell has big problems. Langdell, the defendant, is in a
"conspiracy" with Holmes to run a law journal. Holmes's statement,
made to a law journal colleague concerning an organizational meeting,
was uttered "in furtherance" of the journal's work and during the
"pendency" of the joint effort. Accordingly, the prosecution could offer
Holmes's statement to Pound pursuant to Rule 8o1(d)(2)(E). In what
material way is the statement different from ordinary hearsay that
common law courts have excluded for centuries? The prosecution would
produce Pound, who has no personal knowledge of Holmes's
whereabouts on the day of the murder, to repeat Holmes's statement
("I'm waiting for the cable guy all day at my apartment in Brooklyn") in
an effort to prove the matter that Holmes asserted-that he was in
Brooklyn. Consider again the justifications asserted for the Exception's
existence in our law of evidence. If Holmes is the editor-in-chief, one
could hardly argue that he is Langdell's "agent" when transacting law
review businessY" Holmes's statement, an explanation for missing a
meeting, is no "verbal act" or "res gestae." And unless law journal editors
are known for unflinching honesty and pinpoint accuracy with respect to
the excuses they offer one another, there is no particular reason to
believe that Holmes's statement is any more inherently reliable than
other "my friend told me he did such-and-such" declarations commonly
excluded by the Hearsay Rule.
The appeal to necessity is all that remains. It may indeed be
necessary that participants in criminal conspiracies be condemned by the
statements of their confederates, and centuries of practice indicate that
eminent jurists so believe. If, however, one realizes that the Exception
results in the admission of unreliable evidence, that no justification but
bare necessity supports its admission, and that courts in practice have
always limited the Exception's scope to criminal conspiracies, then a
proposal to expand the exception can hardly be taken seriously. It would
be one thing if the revisionist position, which flies in the face of
commonsense understandings of the word "conspiracy" (to say nothing
of definitions in dictionaries"), were some quirk of the law handed down
since the reign of Henry II. Such history would provide no independent
proof that the law is what it ought to be, but it would at least bring
307. Then again, that theory is about as credible as what the government asserted in United States
v. Layton, where prosecutors argued (and the Ninth Circuit found) that cult leader Jim Jones was the
"agent" of one of his minions. See 855 F.2d 1388, 1399 (9th Cir. 1988); see also supra notes 215-29 and
accompanying text.
308. E.g.. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY. suipra note 208, at 329 (defining "conspiracy" as "agreement
by two or more persons to commit an unlawful act, coupled with an intent to achieve the agreement's
objective, and (in most states) action or conduct that furthers the agreement; a combination for an
unlawful purpose").
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tradition to the revisionists' side. Instead, zealous prosecutors would
have courts abandon decades, even centuries of practice, all to support
the argument that, somehow, the word "conspiracy" in the evidence code
enacted by the Congress of the United States does not mean
"conspiracy."
V. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND OTHER LOOMING PROBLEMS
In addition to exemplifying bad policy, the revisionist interpretation
creates additional tension between the Exception and the constitutional
right of criminal defendants to confront adverse witnesses. This Part
reviews the treatment of the Exception under the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to
the Constitution, which provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him."3 o" It also discusses a more mundane problem: the possibility
that the revisionist interpretation could create crushing discovery
obligations- among other problems-if applied to complex civil
litigation.
A. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE OF THE SIxTH AMENDMENT
The existence of a constitutional right to confront one's accusers is
popularly traced to the infamous trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, in which
Raleigh argued that a witness against him had no choice but to lie in
response to prosecutorial pressure, and that he would recant if only
Raleigh had the chance to confront him.10 If taken literally, the Clause
would bar all hearsay, or at least all hearsay uttered by a declarant
unavailable for examination at trial. No serious observer, however, has
argued that the Clause is so broad. Its guarantee is rooted in the tradition
of adversary common-law trials, and American courts have carved out
exceptions found under the common law of evidence, as well as their
modern codified equivalents.3"' Indeed, hearsay was accepted as evidence
in criminal trials in the decades after ratification pursuant to established
exceptions." Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged the practice, 313 writing
309. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
310. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44; see also supra notes 6o-65 and accompanying text.
31I. See Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542, 547-48 (1926). Professor John Maguire, who
identified "adversary practice" as a "motive" for the creation of hearsay exceptions, illuminates the
tension inherent in the Rule. See JOHN MAcARTHUR MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE: COMMON SENSE AND COMMON
LAW I4o-44 (1947). If it exists to create fair trials, some exceptions will almost surely be necessary-
lest good evidence be kept out with bad -and over centuries judges and commentators have forged
the common ones into black-letter rules of evidence. Id.
312. See, e.g., State v. Baynard, IDel. Cas. 662, 662 (1794) (Read, C.J.) (stating, in murder case,
that although "the rule be general that hearsay evidence is illegal, yet this rule is subject to many
exceptions"). Chief Justice George Read, a signer of the Declaration of Independence and of the
Constitution, led the ratification movement in Delaware. 3 HENRY CLAY CONRAD, HIsTORY OF THE
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a lengthy opinion about whether particular coconspirator statements
could be admitted at the trial of Aaron Burr, an opinion in which
Marshall does not question the principle that hearsay exceptions do
sometimes apply.3 4
The Supreme Court has stated that the primary purpose of the
Confrontation Clause is to ensure the right to cross-examination, not
merely a face-to-face encounter between witness and defendant.3 5 The
right of the accused to confront and cross-examine witnesses against her
is important in ensuring the reliability of the evidence, a benefit not
obtainable by the cross-examination of a witness who is repeating the
words of others.36 A recurring problem concerning the application of the
Confrontation Clause to hearsay arises when a codefendant confesses. In
Delli Paoli v. United States, the Court held that confessions of
codefendant coconspirators are admissible at the joint trial even when
made after the conspiracy ended, as long as the jury is instructed to use
the confession against only the confessing defendant.' Overruling Delli
Paoli, the Court in Bruton v. United States held that when one
codefendant confesses, multiple defendants must either have separate
trials or separate juries, so that the jury deciding the fate of the
nonconfessing defendant does not hear the postconspiracy confession of
his confederate.38
STATE OF DELAWARE 858-59 (1908). In Baynard, the court found that although the Rule did not
prevent the witness from testifying as to certain statements by the victim, the statements were
inadmissible because originally uttered by a black man:
Many of our laws recognize the servile state of Negroes among us and seem to require them
to be deprived of many privileges enjoyed by white persons.... While these laws and this
system continue in force, it would be both illegal and impolitic to admit the testimony of
Negroes in any cases whatever wherein white persons are interested.
i Del. Cas. at 662.
313. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 193 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694) (Marshall, C.J.)
("This rule [prohibiting admission of hearsay] as a general rule is permitted to stand, but some
exceptions to it have been introduced, concerning the extent of which a difference of opinion prevails,
and that difference produces the present question.").
314. Burr was on trial for a misdemeanor, charged "with beginning, with setting on foot, with
preparing, and with providing the means for a military expedition to be carried on against [the
dominions or territory of the king of Spain]." Id. at 195. Chief Justice Marshall was aware of the
problems inherent in hearsay, observing, "The rule of evidence which rejects mere hearsay testimony,
which excludes from trials of a criminal or civil nature the declarations of any other individual than of
him against whom the proceedings are instituted, has been generally deemed all essential to the
correct administration of justice." Id. at 193.
315. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965). This case also served as the Court's
opportunity to formally apply the Confrontation Clause to the states through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 406.
336. See Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (Black. J., dissenting).
317. 352 U.S. 232. 239-43 (1957).
318. 39' U.S. 123, '37 (1968). Bruton does not apply when the statement can come in under Rule
801(d)(2)(E). See United States v. Alcantar, 271 F.3d 73', 739 (8th Cir. 200r).
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The Court resolved an important unsettled issue in California v.
Green, holding that although the Confrontation Clause and the Hearsay
Rule had similar goals and limitations, they were not identical. 9 In other
words, a statement could violate the Rule but not the Clause, or in the
alternative could be admissible under the Rule but inadmissible under
the Clause.320 This case led to a series of decisions attempting to parse out
the differences between the Confrontation Clause and the Rule,
culminating with the Court's landmark 2004 decision in Crawford.321
After Green, the Court struggled to delineate a clear rule to indicate
exactly what kinds of admissible hearsay statements were admissible
under the Confrontation Clause. In Ohio v. Roberts, the Court held that
hearsay evidence "absent a showing of particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness" is inadmissible at criminal trials,32 2 which led to a
complicated and unpredictable system for determining which hearsay
and nonhearsay statements violated the Confrontation Clause. In
Roberts, the Court set forth a two-tiered analysis that automatically
admits any statement covered by a "firmly rooted hearsay exception"
without analysis of its "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."3 23
The circuits split on whether the coconspirator exception was considered
a firmly rooted exception. 324
B. CRAWFORD AND ITs PROGENY
The Court overturned Roberts with Crawford v. Washington,
holding that court-determined indicia of reliability are not a substitute
for actual cross-examination, and that all "testimonial" statements must
be subject to cross-examination unless included on a very narrow list of
exceptions."2 The Court used a historical analysis of the Confrontation
Clause and of the Rule to conclude that there is no real substitute for
cross-examination in cases of testimonial hearsay, unless the declarant is
legally unavailable and the defendants had an opportunity to cross-
examine him previously."' The Court, however, made a special note of
certain types of hearsay-including coconspirator statements -carving
them out as "non-testimonial" by definition.32 ' After Crawford, the next
319. 399 U.S. 149, 155 (970).
320. Id. at 155-56.
321. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
322. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
323. Id.
324. See Sanson v. United States, 467 U.S. 1264, 1265 (1984) (White, J., dissenting) (denying cert.
to 727 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 2004)).
325. 541 U.S. at 68-69.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 55 Trial judges have noted, however, "that Crawford did not 'issue a mandate that all
co-conspirator statements are to be considered non-testimonial.'" United States v. Stein, Si 05 Crim.
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major Supreme Court case to interpret the clause was Davis v.
Washington, in which the Court evaluated whether a 911 emergency call
was testimonial, holding that the parts of the phone call that had been
played for the jury were not testimonial because their purpose was to
"address the exigency of the moment."328 In Whorton v. Bockting, the
Court held that the principle announced in Crawford was not a
"watershed rul[e]," and therefore need not be applied retroactively in
cases where lower courts followed Roberts before Crawford was
decided. 29
C. APPLICATION OF CONFRONTATION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE TO THE
COCONSPIRATOR EXCEPTION
As a flood of commentary has discussed at length, Crawford
substantially changed how American trial courts apply the Confrontation
Clause to hearsay.330 Although Crawford described most statements
admitted under the Exception as "non-testimonial," proponents of the
revisionist interpretation should remember that, first, such statements
are dicta and, second, the Crawford Court almost surely did not consider
the potential application of the Exception to lawful ventures when
mentioning the Exception in passing. It is not necessary here to
summarize the Crawford literature, only to note that the Supreme Court
has in recent years become far more vigorous in protecting the
Confrontation Clause rights of defendants. For example, in Giles v.
California, the Court struck down "a provision of California law that
permits admission of out-of-court statements describing the infliction or
threat of physical injury on a declarant when the declarant is unavailable
to testify at trial and the prior statements are deemed trustworthy." 331
The Giles Court held that wrongdoing by the accused resulting in the
unavailability of a witness forfeits the right to confrontation only when
the conduct was intended to render the witness unavailable.3 32 Last year
the Court decided another case, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, in
which the Justices held that a laboratory report prepared for use in a
888, 2007 WL 3oo9650, at * fn.2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2007) (quoting United States v. Baines, 486 F.
Supp. 2d 1288, 1300 (D.N.M. 2007)).
328. 547 U.S. 813, 828 (2006).
329. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406.416-18 (2007) (alteration in original).
330. See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, Revisiting the Fictional Originalism in Crawford's "Cross-
Examination Rule": A Reply to Mr Kry, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 557 (2007); Michael H. Graham,
Crawford/Davis "Testimonial" Interpreted, Removing the Clutter; Application Summary, 62 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 81I (2008): Seigel & Weisman, supra note 102 (paying particular attention to Crawford's effect
on the Exception.).
331. 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2682 (2008). The California Court of Appeal had "concluded that [defendant]
had forfeited his right to confront [a witness] because he had committed the murder for which he was
on trial, and because his intentional criminal act made [the witness] unavailable to testify." Id.
332. Id. at 2688.
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criminal prosecution is considered "testimonial" under Crawford,
meaning it cannot be admitted unless its author appears in court and is
subject to cross-examination.' It remains difficult to predict the
resolution of any number of questions asked in Crawford's wake. The
Justices issued five separate opinions in Giles, and Justice Scalia accused
his dissenting colleagues of implicitly seeking to overrule Crawford.334
The possibility of changes in Court personnel beyond the succession of
Justice Souter by Justice Sotomayor further complicates any attempt to
predict how the Justices will treat any particular species of statement
admitted without cross-examination. 335
Although the odds are good that the historical Exception is safe
under Crawford-after all, the Court said so explicitly, even if in
dicta336 - Crawford and its progeny have focused on the Court's
interpretation of legal history, with opinions debating the state of the law
in England and America hundreds of years ago.337 Because the revisionist
interpretation of the Exception so clearly defies centuries of usage, with
American cases and commentaries from the early i8oos (if not earlier)
stating that the Exception applies to "illegal" conspiracies, the Court
may well balk if prosecutors continue to seek the expansion of Rule
8o(d)(2)(E). It is not uncommon for prosecutors, or civil parties, to
introduce under Rule 8o1(d)(2)(E) deposition testimony taken from a
witness unavailable at trial.33' Normally, statements made at a hearing
333. 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009). In Briscoe v. Virginia, No. 07-11191 (U.S. Jan. 25, 2010) (per
curiam), the Court declined an opportunity to revisit the holding of Melendez-Diaz. See Transcript of
Oral Argument at 50, Briscoe, No. 07-11191 (Justice Scalia: "Why is this case here except as an
opportunity to upset Melendez-Diaz?"), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/
argument-transcripts.html.
334. 128 S. Ct. at 2680-81 (noting that Justice Scalia "delivered the opinion of the Court, except as
to Part II-D-2"); id. at 2691 (plurality opinion) ("[T]he dissent issues a thinly veiled invitation to
overrule Crawford and adopt an approach not much different from the regime of Ohio v. Roberts,
under which the Court would create the exceptions that it thinks consistent with the policies
underlying the confrontation guarantee, regardless of how that guarantee was historically
understood." (citation omitted)).
335. Justice Scalia wrote for a five-Justice majority in Melendez-Diaz, and the majority included
the since-retired Justice Souter. See 129 S. Ct. at 2530. In Giles, Justice Souter wrote a separate
opinion concurring in part. See 128 S. Ct. at 2694 (Souter, J., concurring in part).
336. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
337. See, e.g., Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2683 (going back to Lord Morley's Case, from 1666, in evaluating
when a defendant's wrongful conduct forfeits his right to confront an absent witness); Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 69-70 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (citing
eighteenth-century cases and treatises and concluding that the majority's "distinction between
testimonial and nontestimonial statements, contrary to its claim, is no better rooted in history than our
current doctrine" under Ohio v. Roberts).
338. See, e.g., United States v. Holmes, 406 F.3d 337, 346-47 (5th Cir. 2005) ("Holmes contends the
district court admitted the videotaped and transcribed deposition testimony of Pauline Gonzalez in
contravention of his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. The government proffered Gonzalez's
deposition testimony as a co-conspirator's statement under Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2)(E) . .). The alleged underlying conspiracy involved mail fraud. Id. at 343-44; see also
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
would qualify as archetypical "testimonial" statements and would trigger
the Confrontation Clause.339 The introduction of prior deposition
testimony at a criminal trial would accordingly seem in tension with
Crawford, despite Crawford's dicta to the effect that the Exception does
not concern "testimonial" statements. If the Exception were expanded to
include entirely lawful conduct, thereby dubbing much of the vast
universe of civil deposition testimony "not hearsay,"'" the tension would
increase considerably.34'
Deponents testifying in the course of employment (for example,
answering questions about business practices as part of discovery in a
commercial dispute) would presumably be considered to speak "in
furtherance" of their employer's objective. Under the revisionist
position, nearly any remark made by a civil deponent who testified "on
the clock," should it later become useful to a criminal prosecutor, would
be admissible at subsequent criminal trials of fellow employees without
any need for cross-examination of the absent deponent. Consider again
Langdell, the hypothetical law journal editor accused of murder. Had his
colleague Holmes been deposed in his capacity as an editor (perhaps in a
case concerning a slip and fall at the journal's offices), he might have
United States v. Hendricks, No. 95-21072, 1997 WL 304169, at *2 (5th Cir. May 15, 1997) ("The
district court admitted portions of deposition testimony given by Frye and Verkin in a related
bankruptcy proceeding as well as Frye's answers to interrogatories pursuant to Rule 8oi(d)(2)(E), as
statements of co-conspirators."); United States v. Brennan, 994 F.2d 918, 927 (ist Cir. 1993): SEC v.
Tome, 833 F.2d io86, 1094-95 (2d Cir. 1987) (insider trading enforcement action); Marino v. Mayger,
i18 F. App'x 393 4o6 (ioth Cir. 2004) (attempt to use, in a civil case, hearsay deposition testimony
concerning alleged illegal conspiracy).
339. See Holmes, 406 F.3d at 348-49 (declining to decide whether civil deposition testimony by a
coconspirator was "testimonial" under Crawford).
340. For an example of SEC lawyers seeking, in an enforcement action, to introduce testimony
from a civil proceeding, see SEC's Trial Brief and Motion Pursuant to FRE 8o1(d)(2)(A) and (E) to
Admit Defendant Jordan's Prior Testimony into Evidence Against All Defendants, supra note 203, at
5-6, arguing that the underlying "common goal" of declarant and defendant need not be "an unlawful
conspiracy" to justify admission of prior testimony pursuant to Rule 8o1(d)(2)(E) (citing United States
v. Gewin, 471 F-3d 197, 200-03 (D.C. Cir. 20o6)).
341. The Supreme Court would likely resolve the tension by holding that even if the Exception
converts certain deposition testimony into "not hearsay," such evidence is nonetheless inadmissible
under Crawford. The majority stated in Melendez-Diaz that admissibility under Crawford depends not
on whether certain evidence fits into a hearsay exception but instead on whether it fits the Court's
definition of "testimonial." See 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2539-40 (2009) ("Business and public records are
generally admissible absent confrontation not because they qualify under an exception to the hearsay
rules, but because-having been created for the administration of an entity's affairs and not for the
purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial-they are not testimonial. Whether or not they
qualify as business or official records, the analysts' statements here-prepared specifically for use at
petitioner's trial-were testimony against petitioner, and the analysts were subject to confrontation
under the Sixth Amendment."); see also id. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("I write separately to
note that I continue to adhere to my position that 'the Confrontation Clause is implicated by
extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony. or confessions.'" (quoting white v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365
(1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part))).
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testified about what editors were in the office on a certain day. Perhaps
he mentioned Langdell's absence. If Langdell later claimed at his
unrelated murder trial that he was in the office on the day in question,
the prosecution could introduce the prior statement of Holmes-
Langdell's "coconspirator" at the journal-which Holmes made "in
furtherance" of the journal's operations.342 The statement is surely
testimonial, and the revisionist interpretation of the Exception would
allow its admission regardless of whether Holmes is subjected to cross-
examination. Whatever people had in mind when the Sixth Amendment
was written and ratified, such a giant loophole in the Confrontation
Clause can hardly have been imagined. 343
Civil deposition testimony is just one category of the boundless
number of statements uttered every day in furtherance of lawful joint
ventures. Under the rule stated in Gewin, deposition statements "in
furtherance" are not hearsay, and a prosecutor may introduce them at
will.3" Because the Supreme Court has not addressed the revisionist
interpretation of the Exception, much less how such an enlarged
exception to the Hearsay Rule would fare under Crawford, trial courts
should be careful to avoid infecting their proceedings with constitutional
error. 345 The revisionist position is bad enough as a matter of history and
of policy. The potential for constitutional violations only bolsters the
case against such a radical revision of the rules of evidence.
The new Crawford regime also highlights how implausible the
revisionist argument becomes when suggesting that the authors of the
Federal Rules of Evidence meant to apply the Exception to lawful
ventures not previously considered "conspiracies." In the 1970s and early
1980s, a circuit split arose concerning the application of the
342. Because Langdell would have had no motive to cross-examine Holmes at the time of the
deposition, the normal hearsay exception for former testimony, FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(i), would not
apply.
343. Again, I expect the Supreme Court would reject the admission of such deposition testimony
regardless of how it construes Rule 8oi(d)(2)(E). See supra note 341. The likely rejection under
Crawford of sworn testimony that might fall within the revisionist interpretation of the Exception
further illustrates the odd nature of the proposed revision. If the Exception applies to lawful joint
ventures, then casual remarks made in furtherance of a normal business would be admissible as "not
hearsay" with no Confrontation Clause problems, see, e.g., infra note 356 and accompanying text, but
sworn deposition testimony concerning a commercial dispute-which one would expect to be far more
reliable than water cooler chatter-would be a form of "not hearsay" barred by Crawford from
admission at criminal trials. Perhaps this possibility says more about Crawford than about the
revisionists.
344. See 471 F.3d 197, 200-02 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
345. Even if the Supreme Court does not decide that the revisionist version of the Exception
violates the Constitution, it could of course simply reject it as an inaccurate statement of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Either way, defendants convicted after the introduction of improper evidence
would have grounds for appeal.
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Confrontation Clause to coconspirator hearsay.346 With courts debating
whether coconspirator statements possess the "indicia of reliability"
required by Dutton and Green, and commentators worrying that the
Confrontation Clause decisions then in force might provide too little
protection against admission of unreliable coconspirator hearsay, it is
highly unlikely that the Advisory Committee would have neglected to
note, even in passing, an expansion of the Exception to include
statements in furtherance of lawful combinations. In particular, courts
evaluating whether the Exception was "firmly rooted" for purposes of
Roberts34' ought to have struggled with the question of whether "joint
venturer hearsay" had deep roots in American constitutional soil, if any
litigant had been bold enough to introduce such evidence. Instead, some
judges noted explicitly that coconspirator hearsay was not inherently
reliable but was admissible instead "because of the legal fiction that each
conspirator is an agent of the other and that the statements of one can
therefore be attributable to all. In effect, the Rules have adopted the
agency rationale, although the framers recognized that this theory is 'at
best a fiction."' 349 These judges recognized that, contrary to the
revisionist position that the Exception applies to lawful ventures, Rule
8o1(d)(2)(E) exists specifically to cover the statements of lawbreakers.
Whereas the principal-agent exception codified at Rule 8o1(d)(2)(D) is
limited to only certain statements made in furtherance of legitimate
enterprises,350  the Coconspirator Exception lacks those limitations
precisely because it covers the statements of those who have agreed to
conduct illegal activities.35'
Under the revisionist position, by contrast, the principal-agent
exception might as well be stricken from the Rules of Evidence. Rule
8o1(d)(2)(D) allows the admission of a "statement ... offered against a
party ... [made] by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter
within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the
existence of the relationship." If the Coconspirator Exception covers all
346. See supra notes 322-24 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Wright, 588 F.2d 31,
37-38 (2d Cir. 1978).
347. See Davenport, supra note 270. As readers will expect by this point, Davenport's analysis
concerns unlawful conspiracies. See id.
348. See, e.g., United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 254-57 (3d Cir. 1983); United States v.
Peacock, 654 F.2d 339, 349-50 (5th Cir. 1981).
349. Ammar, 714 F.2d at 255-56 (citation omitted) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 8oI(d)(2)(E) advisory
committee's note); see also United States v. Goldberg, 1oS F.3d 770, 775-76 (ist Cir. 1997); United
States v. Morrow, 39 F-3d 1228, 1235 (ist Cir. 1994); United States v. Fielding, 645 F.2d 719. 725-26 &
n.13 (9th Cir. 1981).
350. See supra notes 114, 274-78 and accompanying text.
351. Ammar, 714 F.2d at 256 (listing, among other factors determining if a coconspirator statement
is reliable for purposes of Roberts, "whether the declarant had personal knowledge of the identity and
role of the participants in the crime" (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654,
66i (9th Cir. 1981))).
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statements made in furtherance of and during the pendency of any joint
undertaking, whether lawful or unlawful, nearly every statement
admissible under the principal-agent exception would also be covered by
the Coconspirator Exception. The only statements admissible exclusively
under Rule 8oi(d)(2)(D) would be utterances of agents or employees
that () concern "a matter within the scope of the agency or
employment," (2) are "made during the existence of the [agency or
employment] relationship," yet (3) are not "in the scope of" the
relationship's common goal. This is not a null set; employees can
certainly make statements about their work that are not within their
assigned duties but would nonetheless be relevant to litigation.
Regardless, I believe the drafters of the Federal Rules would be
surprised to see the principal-agent exception construed to have so
narrow a purpose, particularly because the Advisory Committee
affirmatively chose to expand the scope of this particular class of
admissions.352
D. THE THREAT TO CIVIL LITIGATION-A DISCOVERY NIGHTMARE
In addition to creating tension with the Confrontation Clause if
applied in criminal trials, the revisionist interpretation poses a serious
threat to civil litigation. Because the Exception applies in civil as well as
criminal cases, the revisionist interpretation would allow civil parties to
introduce statements uttered by any declarant in furtherance of any
"joint venture" with another party to litigation. Imagine a complex
lawsuit among corporate giants Alpha Corp. and Beta Corp. Already,
many statements made at work by Alpha and Beta employees would be
"party admissions" and therefore admissible even if hearsay." Similarly,
certain corporate records would be admissible if produced in the
ordinary course of business.354 The party admission exception, however,
applies only to employees of the party against whom the evidence is
offered; it does not apply to other parties, much less to entities
uninvolved in the lawsuit.355 Let us now imagine that prior to the filing of
Alpha's suit against Beta, while the acts and omissions giving rise to the
litigation were ongoing, Beta participated in a joint venture with
Gamma, Inc., a relationship that ended with accusations of incompetence
flying in all directions. During the pendency of the venture, Gamma
352. See FED. R. EVID. 8oi(d)(2)(D) advisory committee's note (justifying expansion on ground
that although "tradition has been to test the admissibility of statements by agents, as admissions, by
applying the usual test of agency," the "loss of valuable and helpful evidence" had increasingly led to a
"trend [that] favors admitting statements related to a matter within the scope of the agency or
employment" even when the speaker was not "acting in the scope of his employment").
353. See FED. R. EVID. 80I(d)(2)(D).
354. See id. R. 803(6) ("Records of regularly conducted activity.").
355. See id. R. 8ol(d)(2).
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employees made a variety of statements that depict Beta in a negative
way. At the Alpha-Beta trial, hearsay statements by Gamma employees
would not be admissible against Beta under Rule 8o1(d)(2)(D) because
the Gamma employees are "servants" of Gamma, not Beta. An
enterprising Alpha attorney might then turn to Rule 8o1(d)(2)(E),
arguing that certain statements by Gamma are "by a coconspirator of a
party [Beta] during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." If
lawful joint ventures satisfy the Exception, then any Gamma statements
"in furtherance of" the Beta-Gamma project would be admissible against
Beta. If the Gamma CEO said to her general counsel, "Those Beta guys
are a bunch of chumps who are giving Alpha Corp. total junk, so we need
to watch them extra carefully during this project," the statement would
clearly be "in furtherance" of the venture."' Even if the Gamma CEO is
not available to testify at the Alpha-Beta trial, the Gamma GC could be
deposed-with accompanying expense and inconvenience -about the
CEO's statements. Alpha could then introduce those statements to prove
what the CEO asserted, "Those Beta guys are a bunch of chumps who
are giving Alpha Corp. total junk."5
If this theory prevails, diligent corporate counsel would have the
duty to investigate what unflattering hearsay might be admissible against
corporate defendants under the new understanding of the Exception.
After all, the universe of newly-admissible evidence would hardly be
confined to statements by Gamma, Inc. If Beta had relationships with
Delta Corp. and Epsilon Corp., then Alpha attorneys would be wise to
contact Delta and Epsilon employees to see what might have been said in
furtherance of those ventures. Beta's attorneys, knowing what Alpha has
in mind, would naturally reach out to Delta and Epsilon too. One or
another of the parties would soon enough transmit a third-party
discovery request to counsel for Gamma, Delta, and Epsilon, seeking
records of statements in furtherance of Beta-related ventures. Custodians
of such records, in addition to whoever said or wrote the statements
recorded, would become prime candidates for interrogatories and
depositions. Further, third-party corporations would not be the only
entities whose records might contain valuable "coconspirator"
statements. While courts have held that Rule 8oI(d)(2)(D) does not
allow criminal defendants to introduce hearsay statements made by
356. Badmouthing one's coventurers would be "in furtherance' of the venture in that it would
encourage vigilance and could ferret out bad members of the venture. For a concrete example, see
infra notes 363-73 and accompanying text (discussing Miller v. Holzmann).
357. If the revisionist interpretation of the Exception prevails, one can only hope that trial judges
will reject many statements made in furtherance of ordinary businesses pursuant to Rule 4o3, which
provides, "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED.
R. EVID. 403.
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government agents in furtherance of their work,"' with reasoning that
would likely apply to Rule 8o1(d)(2)(E) even if the revisionist position
were adopted, civil litigation is a different matter. When a government
agent is sued in her personal capacity, 59 the revisionist interpretation of
the Exception would allow the admission against the agent of statements
by government employees in furtherance of their work,'60 even
statements made before the agent began her employment.'
In addition to inspiring the hypothetical examples presented above,
the rule set forth in Gewin has already infected civil litigation. In Miller
v. Holzmann, a relator brought a qui tam action' alleging fraud against
the United States, claiming that companies hired to perform American-
funded construction projects in Egypt had engaged in a broad "bid-
rigging" conspiracy.364 The contract at issue, known as Contract 2oA,
"was awarded to a Joint Venture between Defendants Harbert
International, Inc. and J.A. Jones Construction Company, [and] was
valued at over $ioo million.' 6 5 Richard Miller, the relator, was a former
Vice President and Treasurer of J.A. Jones, Inc., the parent company of
Defendant J.A. Jones Construction Company. 66 Upon hearing "that
every U.S. contractor that was prequalified to do USAID work in Cairo
was a member of a club that had been set up and met in Frankfurt to
essentially setup or rig the bids," Miller informed his boss, Jones
President Charles Davidson, who "advised Miller that he would inform
Johnie Jones, CEO of parent company J.A. Jones, Inc."'' When Miller
testified at trial about Davidson's statement, Harbert objected to the
testimony as hearsay. 68 Neither Miller nor Davidson was in on the fraud;
their only "joint venture" was the construction contract.,6 9 Harbert also
objected to the admission of statements by other innocent J.A. Jones
employees, including one who recounted what he heard about someone
358. See Anne Bowen Poulin, Party Admissions in Criminal Cases: Should the Government Have
to Eat Its Words?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 40,402-03 (2002).
359. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 389-90 (1971).
360. The theory would be that the defendant agent was in a "conspiracy" with the employee
declarants, a conspiracy to perform the lawful task of operating a government agency.
361. See supra note 277.
362. The case discussed here is the "other outlier" mentioned in the discussion of the survey
results. See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
363. In a qui tam action, the plaintiff (called the "relator") sues on behalf of the United States. If
the suit succeeds, the relator gets a share of the government's recovery. See generally Vt. Agency of
Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768-69 & n.rx, 772 (2000).
364. See Miller v. Holzmann, 563 F. Supp. 2d 54, 73-75 (D.D.C. 2oo8).
365. See Relator's Fifth Amended Complaint for False Claims Act Violations & Demand for Jury
Trial i, United States ex ret Miller v. Bill Harbert Int'l Constr., Inc., 563 F. Supp. 2d 54 (D.D.C.
2008) (No. I:95-CV-1231), 2007 WL 4705249-
366. Id. 4.




"paying other contractors to refrain from bidding."3 0 The District Court,
finding that Davidson's statement was in furtherance of "the joint
venture [which] would [benefit] from uncovering any illegality among its
activities," admitted the statements pursuant to Rule 8o1(d)(2)(E)." The
District Court also addressed the defendants' objection to the
interpretation of the Exception provided in Gewin: "[Defendants]
contend Gewin 'is contrary to the plain language of Rule 8o1(d)(2)(E)
and Supreme Court precedent.' Whatever else it may be, however,
Gewin is binding precedent to which this Court must adhere."37 2
Accordingly, the District Court admitted out-of-court statements made
in furtherance of a lawful objective, the construction of Cairo's sewers,
pursuant to the Exception.373
Statements like those admitted in Miller are not within the
traditional scope of the Exception. As the trial judge acknowledged,
"Rule [8o(d)(2)(E)] exempts statements of a party's co-conspirators
during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy, when they are
offered against the party. Gewin extends the exception to joint venturers'
statements during and in furtherance of the joint venture."374 This
hearsay has no place in American trials, yet civil litigators providing
zealous advocacy will continue offering it so long as Gewin remains the
law of the Circuit. In addition, until other courts -or perhaps Congress-
explicitly reject the revisionist interpretation, litigators and prosecutors
will continue their efforts to bring the Gewin rule to other circuits.
CONCLUSION
Centuries of practice in England and America produced an
exception to the Hearsay Rule covering statements by a party's
coconspirator made during and in furtherance of joint illegal activity.
The definition and scope of the Coconspirator Exception cohered by the
nineteenth century, with early American treatises and cases using
materially identical language to describe what hearsay it would allow into
370. Id. at 87-88 (noting report was made in reply to a "query about a large and seemingly
inexplicable payment"); see Reply of Harbert International, Inc. & Harbert Corp. in Support of Their
Motion for a New Trial as to All Claims at 10-13, United States ex rel. Miller, 563 F. Supp. 2d 54 (No.
1:95-CV-123i), 2007 WL 47023oo. The statements would be admissible against J.A. Jones under the
principal-agent exception or as party admissions. The plaintiff could use them against Harbert only if
statements by Davidson and other Jones employees, who were lawful participants in Contract 2oA,
were admissible not only against their employer but also against all participants in the joint venture.
371. Miller, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 86-87.
372. Id. at 86 n.29 (citation omitted).
373. See id. at 73.
374. Id. at 85 n.28 (citation omitted).
375. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. It is possible that this Article will convince
prosecutors and litigators to cease their revisionist efforts. Judicial decisions would likely provide
valuable additional encouragement.
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evidence. Over the past few decades, however, revisionists have
advocated expanding the Exception to include statements made in
furtherance of lawful "joint ventures," arguing that Federal Rule of
Evidence Soi(d)(2)(E), and the common law rule of evidence on which it
was based, have always covered such statements. In dicta, and occasional
holdings, some courts have accepted the revisionist theory. Courts-or
Congress, should it prove necessary-must reject this radical alteration
of the Exception. Indeed, prosecutors should immediately stop
advocating the "joint venture" theory lest they taint otherwise sound
prosecutions with improper evidence.
The revisionist interpretation would worsen a rule with an already-
weak theoretical basis. Revisionist arguments often misconstrue court
precedents, and they nearly always include inaccurate legal history.
Applying the Exception to lawful joint undertakings, by abrogating the
Federal Rules of Evidence, would permit the admission of unreliable
evidence now soundly rejected by the Hearsay Rule, and it would burden
civil litigation with needless additional discovery. As the survey
recounted in Part III demonstrates, in actual practice the federal courts
have limited the Exception to statements made in furtherance of
unlawful objectives. This policy should be celebrated, and courts should
continue doing what they have done, irrespective of invitations in dicta-
and the rare holding-to revise a settled rule in contradiction of history
and common sense.
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